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Abstract
Food programs are large and expensive components of social safety nets in
developing countries. For agricultural households, hunger is more acute in annual
lean seasons, but food policies typically do not adapt to seasonality. There is
limited research on this because of a paucity of panel data that tracks households
across seasons. In this paper, we analyze consumption and income seasonality in
East Indonesia. We design a unique seasonal household panel, develop a model to
explain how credit and saving constraints generate seasonality, and present results
from a randomized experiment of food storage and food credit. In both programs,
economic well-being increased substantially (a one standard deviation increase).
Under credit, participants report a reduction in both seasonal consumption gaps
and food shortage, health improvements when credit is disbursed but deterioration
when repayments are due. Under storage, households with a high propensity to
save report a strong reduction in food shortages.
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1 Introduction
The Food and Agricultural Organization estimated that 1.02 billion individuals were
undernourished in 2009 (FAO). Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger is the first of
eight United Nations Millenium Development Goals. Much of this hunger is seasonal,
especially for farmers who depend on rain-fed agriculture.1 Khandker (2009) estimates
that 93% of households in the Greater Rangpur region in Bangladesh were below the
food poverty line during the lean season in 2000, compared to 80% during the rest
of the year.2 Incomes and prices can also vary greatly within the agricultural cycle.
If households are unable to effectively borrow or save, market frictions can generate
cyclical variation in food shortages.
In several developing countries, food security policies are central to social safety
nets and are characterized by high fiscal costs. In the Philippines, the rice subsidy pro-
gram accounts for 70% of public social protection expenditures (Jha and Ramaswami,
2010). In Indonesia, the food subsidy program, Raskin, cost 0.23% of GDP in 2009
(Trinugroho et al., 2011). The seasonality of hunger is a common topic in policy dis-
cussions but many food security programs do not adjust to the timing and severity of
food shortages. A recent World Bank report advocates that India’s food subsidy pro-
gram be modified to allow households to roll over their monthly quota to deal with
seasonal variation in prices (The World Bank, 2011). A 2005 report by the Govern-
ment of Indonesia notes that seasonal food insecurity is perhaps the most common
form of food insecurity (GOI, 2005). One reason seasonality is ignored in the design
of food policy could be the lack of data that tracks households across seasons, making
it impossible for many top-down food policies to vary household eligibility by season.
This paper studies food policy through the lens of seasonality. We make two con-
tributions. First, we present the results from a unique, large-scale panel survey in West
Timor. Second, we conduct a randomized evaluation of two market-based food security
programs. The region is primarily dependent on rain-fed agriculture and suffers from
predictable annual hunger periods known locally as musim paceklik (famine season).3
1See Vaitla et al. (2009) for a discussion.
2The food poverty line was calculated by estimating the cost of a food basket needed to maintain
the per capita daily caloric requirement (2112 calories) recommended by FAO (Food and Agricultural
Organization).
3Fox (1977) writes: "On Timor, in particular, it is usually expected as a kind of annual inevitability
that there will be a hunger period of a month or more as food supplies dwindle before the next harvest.
If in the previous year crops have failed to any great extent, the hunger period becomes a famine. Given
the nature of their economy, there is little – save husbanding of all food resources – that a Timorese can
2
Our goal is to analyze seasonal variation in not just food consumption but also other
expenditure patterns. The programs are designed to facilitate credit and savings in turn,
which could help households overcome market frictions by lowering the opportunity
cost of lean season consumption. Each program is independently evaluated against a
control group.
Motivated by the lack of data investigating seasonality, we designed a series of
surveys that tracks 2,877 households. We look at consumption, expenditures, health,
income, employment, and subjective predictions across seasons over three years. Most
studies of seasonality have had to rely on aggregating repeated cross-sections of house-
holds to construct village level, seasonal panels. However, to study income and con-
sumption seasonality, it is necessary to have household level seasonal panels (Khand-
ker, 2009).4 First, multiple seasonal visits for each household reduce the measurement
error of a household’s average consumption and income (Deaton and Grosh, 1998),
two important measures of economic well-being. Second, panels using village means
that aggregate across households mask rich, within household variation. For example,
for quarterly income and weekly food expenditures, we find that the within household
standard deviations were 1.6 times the between household standard deviations. To
measure seasonality, it is important to compare harvest and lean season outcomes for
the same household because there is so much within household variation. Two house-
holds in the same village, for example, could have different harvest and lean season
outcomes in the same year that cancel each other out when we take village means.
Analysis of our seasonal household panel suggests that there is meaningful sea-
sonal variation in objective and subjective measures of well-being, including income,
non-food expenditures and self-reported food shortages, but less seasonality in weekly
food consumption. First, households report anticipated food shortages that vary across
seasons. More than 33% of households anticipate facing food shortages in the next
lean season but only 12% anticipate facing food shortages in the next harvest season.
Second, we find that reported measures of past food shortages are very dynamic. Esti-
mates of transition probabilities using households in control villages suggest that only
40% of households that report lacking food in one period still report lacking food in
the next period. Yet, 93% of households that report receiving Raskin rice in the last
do to stave off this famine."
4Household level seasonal panels are extremely rare. We know of only one other large-scale, seasonal
household panel. This survey was conducted in 1986-1989 in rural Pakistan, tracking 800 households
across seasons. See Alderman and Garcia (1993) for more details. They analyze seasonal patterns of
consumption and expenditure but do not use the data to evaluate food policy.
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period still report receiving it in the next period, suggesting that the food subsidy pro-
gram does not adjust to seasonal food shortages. Third, absolute seasonal differences
in weekly food expenditures, monthly non-food expenditures and quarterly household
income are economically significant.5 For example, the median absolute difference in
weekly food expenditures is 22,000 Rupiahs (the median weekly food expenditure is
27,000 Rupiahs).
We develop a simple model that shows how predictable food shortages in the
lean season cannot be explained by pure borrowing constraints (See, for a discussion,
Deaton and Grosh (1998)). Unlike life-cycles, agricultural cycles are by their very na-
ture repetitive. Hence, even if individuals cannot borrow against a future harvest, they
may be able to save from a previous harvest. Our model incorporates both borrowing
and saving constraints. The saving "constraint" emerges from two features: first, prices
of agricultural output are low during the harvest and high during the lean season, and
second, agricultural output depreciates rapidly when stored. Traditional maize storage
methods, which involve drying over a fire and hanging from the ceiling, result in an
annual depreciation rate of 30% to 50% (deRosari et al., 2001). Additionally, these
methods leave the grain highly visible and subject to what might be termed "social
depreciation," which emerges from community pressures to share.6 The saving and
borrowing constraints imply that individuals are unable to effectively transfer agricul-
tural output from harvest to lean season, either in cash or in kind. In this setting, we find
that access to credit and savings will narrow the gap of inter-seasonal marginal utili-
ties. Each, in effect, provides households with a superior technology (through lower
infestation and less visibility7) to transfer assets from the harvest to lean seasons.
Given that need is time-varying and households might not require constant assis-
tance across the agricultural cycle, subsidies can be expensive. In this paper, we design
and conduct a randomized evaluation of food credit and food storage programs de-
signed to match seasonal patterns of farmers. Unlike subsidies, these are institutional
innovations that, in principle, can be ultimately self-sustaining.
Under the credit treatment, women’s microcredit groups were formed and offered
loans of rice and maize (the primary staples in West Timor) during the lean season,
5These were calculated by taking the absolute difference between the harvest season and lean season
outcomes within each agricultural cycle.
6We collected data on how much households spend in a season on own festival expenditures and
festival expenditures for others. We find that festival expenditures constitute 16% of total annual non-
food expenditures and on average, 53% of this is spent on others.
7Baland et al. (2011) show how credit is used to disguise assets in Cameroon.
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which were to be repaid in kind (with interest) during the following harvest. The
storage treatment introduced several storage technologies that can reduce depreciation
significantly. This is equivalent to significantly raising the interest rate on savings. We
use mean effects analysis to jointly test the effect of our treatments on related outcomes
within 5 categories: objective measures of seasonal differences, subjective measures of
food shortages, health, economic well-being and food consumption. Each outcome
is standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the control group so that
treatment effects are measured in standardized units.
Our results are broadly consistent with the predictions of the model. Compared to
control villages, households in credit villages show a reduction of 0.28 to 0.69 units
for seasonal differences, a reduction of 0.83 units for subjective food shortages, an im-
provement in health by 1.48 units in the lean season when credit was disbursed but a
deterioration of 0.90 units in the harvest season when repayment was due. There is
a large (one standard deviation) increase in economic well-being. We did not detect
effects on food consumption. These mean effects are mostly driven by the following
outcomes: a decrease of 21,000 Rp in the seasonal differences in weekly food expendi-
tures for 2 districts managed by one NGO, a 12% reduction in anticipated food short-
ages in the lean season, a 69% increase in income during the harvest season, household
heads reporting 15 fewer sick days in the lean season compared to 3 more sick days
in the harvest season, and household heads who are 17% more likely to report some
sickness during the harvest season compared to 10% less likely in the lean season.
In the storage program, most significant effects are restricted to households with a
high propensity to save. There is a decrease of 1.33 units (2.11 units) in subjective food
shortages for all (high propensity) households, and an increase of 0.97 (1.10) units in
economic well-being for all (high propensity) households. Beside the improvement
in the physical depreciation rate, storage participants can also circumvent the need to
contribute to neighbors’ festival expenditures by committing to store harvest for the
lean season. Storage participants reported a 10% to 25% reduction in the share of
festival expenditures spent on neighbors’ festivities. These two appear to be the most
important mechanisms behind the treatment effect of the storage program.
Our paper is closely related to the literature that studies food security policies but
to our knowledge, we are the first randomized control trial that evaluates the impact of
food policies.8 In recent years, a number of food credit and storage policies have been
instituted in developing countries. For example, grain banks in Bhutan (Gelay, 2008),
8See for example Jha and Ramaswami (2010); Besley and Kanbur (1990).
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western Africa (Lines, 2011), and Madagascar (Zeller, 2001) engage in various forms
of credit and storage. Our analysis of the programs is essentially an attempt to answer a
policy, rather than behavioral, question. Since the two interventions vary in timing and
structure, a direct comparison of the two would not be informative. Rather, we take
two frequently discussed solutions to problems of seasonality–food credit and food
storage–and examine where the impacts of each lie. Though our program generates
wealth effects through the channels of food, these are not the most responsive mar-
gins. This is consistent with the literature (see for example Banerjee and Duflo (2007);
Strauss and Thomas (1998); Subramanian and Deaton (1996), who show that caloric
deficits among the poor are not as acute as earlier expected). This paper serves as a
reminder that the primary benefits of food programs may be discernible on altogether
different sets of outcomes.
Our paper is also related to the literature on consumption and income seasonality.9
Using cross-sectional data from Thailand and a high frequency panel data from 3 vil-
lages in India, Paxson (1993) and Chaudhuri and Paxson (2002) find that consumption
seasonality does not track income seasonality. However, Khandker (2009) finds that
seasonal income greatly influences seasonal consumption in Bangladesh. Our paper
sheds further light on this question by using a much larger seasonal panel that tracks
the same households over multiple harvest and lean seasons. In an improvement over
the previous literature, we are also able to control for household fixed effects, seasonal
prices and proxies for seasonal expenditures, such as festivities. We find evidence
of income and consumption seasonality. Comparison of maize and rice farmers who
face different seasons show that they have different seasonal income patterns and also
different seasonal food consumption patterns but no difference in monthly non-food
expenditure and festival expenditures.
2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we build a simple consumption-savings model that allows us to demon-
strate seasonality and explore the implications of storage and credit programs, respec-
tively. We show how inter-seasonal fluctuation in consumption emerges as a result of
multiple factors: credit constraints (which prevent borrowing against future harvests)
9See for example Sahn (1989); Paxson (1993); Alderman and Garcia (1993); Handa and Mlay (2006);
Chaudhuri and Paxson (2002); Khandker (2009); Alderman and Sahn (1989); Behrman (1988); Pinstrup-
Anderson and Jaramillo (1989).
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and saving constraints. Saving constraints are a significant factor – individuals have
difficulty storing their harvest due to both physical depreciation (of the staple and the
purchasing power of cash) and informal pressures to share (such as gift and festival
expenditures).
We start by describing an infinitely-lived individual who makes consumption-savings
decisions in each period. To isolate the mechanisms that generate variation within,
rather than across, an agricultural cycle, we assume there is no harvest risk.10 The
stripped-down model has the advantage of explicitly illustrating both how budget con-
straints affect choices and how storage and credit programs modify budget constraints.
2.1 Assumptions
In any year, the individual faces consumption choices in the harvest period (denoted
H) and the lean period (denoted L). In each period, utility is a function of staple
consumption (m, which could be rice or maize) and consumption of a numeraire good
(c). We assume an additively separable utility function. Utility in period t is given
by Ut = um(mt) + uc(ct), where each ui is twice differentiable and strictly concave
everywhere. We also make the following restriction: for each good i, u′ (0) = ∞ (no
corner solutions). Across periods, the agent discounts utility by a factor of δ < 1.
The individual has an initial endowment of the staple in period H, denoted e. She
also has income in each period, yH and yL. We assume that income refers not just to la-
bor income but also to returns to assets. What distinguishes this model from a standard
consumption-savings problem is the nature of the budget constraint, which depends on
how the individual chooses to transfer resources across periods. The decision about
how to transfer resources depends in turn on prices and depreciation rates. We make
the following assumptions. The price of the numeraire good is invariant across seasons:
pcH = p
c
L = 1. The staple is relatively cheaper in the harvest period: pH < pL. Finally,
the staple depreciates. Any staple stored in period H, s, becomes γs in period L.11
The storage treatment can be captured by a rise in γ . The credit treatment can be
captured by the option of a loan, b, that is repaid as rb in the following period.
We interpret γ broadly to include physical depreciation as well as norms related
to gifts, which apply to endowment that is saved in kind (consider norms that create
10We discuss the consequences of risk later in this section.
11It is possible that the problems associated with storage could be solved with more efficient trade.
However, possibly due to transportation costs or a lack of infrastructure, inter-island trade is limited. As
a result, harvest season prices are lower than lean season prices.
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pressure on households to share visibly stored assets–households more vulnerable to
these taxes face a lower γ). By this interpretation, less liquid forms of storage in both
rice and maize can reduce a household’s exposure to social pressures and thereby raise
the retention rate on savings.
2.2 Seasonality
First, we show how seasonality emerges from a combination of borrowing constraints
and saving constraints. In the absence of risk, the consumer essentially faces a two-
period problem (there is never an incentive to transfer resources from one agricultural
cycle to the next). Consider the problem faced by a maize farmer in the harvest period.
She must allocate her income and endowment of the staple to consumption in both
harvest and lean periods. Furthermore, her lean period allocation depends on her saving
methods. If she saves cash, we assume it earns no interest. If she saves the staple, it
depreciates but can be resold at a higher price. Clearly, in the absence of transaction
costs, the agent will save entirely in the staple or entirely in cash.





(1) yH+ pHe− (pHmH+ cH)≥ 0
(2) pLmL+ cL ≤max
{
(A) yL+[pHe+ yH− (pHmH+ cH)]
(B) yL+[pHe+ yH− (pHmH+ cH)] pLpH γ
}
Condition (1) establishes a no-borrowing constraint. Condition (2) states that, given
consumption in H, consumption in L is limited to the depreciated value of assets. If
the agent saves in cash, condition (2A) applies. If she saves the staple, condition (2B)
applies. Notice that the only difference between Conditions (2A) and (2B) is an addi-
tional term, pLpH γ , applied to the assets saved in H. This term represents the loss due to
depreciation combined with the gain from rising staple prices.
We make the assumption that Condition (1) remains slack. Given that harvest gains
are realized in period H, this is reasonable as long as employment income in period L
(yL) is not inordinately high. The individual will choose to save in cash if γ ≤ pHpL . This
is the case where staple depreciation is sufficiently high or price gap is sufficiently low.
Otherwise, she will save the staple.
8
The results resemble those from a standard utility maximization problem with four
goods.12 When the agent chooses to save the staple, it must be the case that the





relative to saving cash, the first-order conditions are skewed towards period L – period
L consumption relative to period H consumption is greater than when saving cash.
This framework can also accommodate the possibility that marginal utilities of con-
sumption vary across time. In particular, we might expect that the higher effort re-
quired during the lean season translates into a higher marginal utility of consumption.
The mechanics of the maximization problem, as well as the tradeoff between saving
in cash and kind, stay the same. In fact, the problems associated with storage and
credit constraints assume greater significance when the agent has more reason to move
consumption to the lean season.
2.3 Predicted Impacts of Programs
An improvement in staple storage technologies serves to increase γ to some γ¯ . De-
pending on the initial conditions, this can affect the individual’s consumption-saving
decisions in three ways. First, if the individual was initially saving in cash, and if γ¯
is a sufficiently small improvement over γ (i.e. γ¯ ≤ pHpL ), she will continue to save in
cash. In this case, the storage technology will have no effect. Second, if the individual
was initially saving in cash, and if γ¯ is sufficiently high (i.e. γ¯ > pHpL ), she will switch
to saving the staple instead. This can be viewed as an overall rise in wealth. Third, if
the individual was initially saving the staple, she will continue to do so, and consume
more in the lean season than before. This too can be viewed as an overall rise in wealth
emerging from raised interest rates (since the no-borrowing constraint is slack).
With credit, the agent has the option to borrow some maize, bm, in period L, which
is repaid in period H with interest, at rbm. We assume that r is sufficiently low that the
agent has no incentive to continue saving in the lean season. The agent might wish to
borrow not just for consumption but for purposes of arbitrage (to sell in the lean season
and buy back in the harvest season). We assume, as explained in Section 3, that there
are institutional limits to loan sizes that prevent this.
Credit impacts the consumer very similarly to storage. If, under storage, a dollar









r in terms of




In order to explicitly derive predictions of impacts from storage and credit pro-
grams, we assume a CRRA utility function: um (x) = uc (x) = x
1− 1a
1− 1a
, where a> 1. First-
order conditions are in the online appendix.
We define the two types of agents above in the following way: "low storage" refers
to types who, in the absence of a program, save little or none of their endowment in
staple form, while "high storage" refers to types who ordinarily prefer to save a large
percentage of their endowment in staple rather than cash. Low storage types might not
respond substantially to a storage program (if they continue saving in cash). However,
we expect that high storage types will – we are offering them a better return on an asset
they already store.
Consider the impact of the storage technology on high storage types: a rise in γ
leads to a reduction in mH , a reduction in cH , a rise in mL, a rise in cL. The rise in
lean season consumption is a natural consequence of improved interest rates, which
brings marginal utilities of lean and harvest season consumption closer to each other.
The reduction in harvest season consumption comes from the fact that income effects
are smaller than substitution effects. Next, we find that there are ambiguous changes
in mH +mL and cH + cL. This is because an improved storage technology has two
effects – quantities already being saved now amount to more in the lean season, but
additional amounts being saved as a result of improved technologies still face some
loss. Therefore, despite positive wealth effects, total annual consumption could drop.
Finally, there should be a reduction in mHmL (bringing the ratio down towards 1, resulting
in a narrowing of the seasonal gap) and and a reduction in cHcL (in this case, bringing the
ratio further below 1).13
Credit can be analyzed in exactly the same manner. A loan at an interest rate of r
can be interpreted as raising retention from γ to 1r (see the first-order conditions). This
serves to make lean season consumption relatively cheaper than before. Additionally,
since decisions are made in the lean season, the discount factor is applied to the harvest
season instead of the lean season. This further raises the attractiveness of the lean
season relative to the harvest season. Under the assumption that r is low enough that
all types will choose to borrow, the impacts of credit are qualitatively similar to the
impacts of storage.
13These results are robust to CARA and log utilities. In all these cases, substitution effects from
storage (which make lean season consumption cheaper) are larger than income effects (which loosen the
overall budget constraint and raise all consumption).
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The predictions are summarized in the table below (using non-food per-capita ex-
penditure as a proxy for non-food consumption):14
Predictions of the model: Credit & High Storage
H staple consumption & non-food PCE fall
L staple consumption & non-food PCE rise
H staple consumption
L staple consumption &
H non-food PCE
L non-food PCE fall
Total staple consumption & total PCE ambiguous: rise or fall
2.4 Risk
Up to this point, we have assumed a fixed harvest. However, we might be concerned
about heterogeneous treatment effects based on harvest size and harvest risk. In partic-
ular, what is the average impact on households that face high cross-cycle variation in
harvests? To get a first-order approximation of how risk affects program impacts, we
consider mean-preservisng spreads around the originally assumed harvest quantity.
First, consider the case of storage, and the impact on lean season staple consump-













. Since this ratio is strictly concave in e,
we know that (a) impacts of storage are rising in the size of the endowment, and (b)
riskier harvests will serve to reduce the average impact of storage on lean season staple
consumption. Following the approach above, we find qualitatively identical results for
harvest season staple consumption, and both lean and harvest season non-food con-
sumption.











this is invariant in e, harvest risk should not affect the impact of storage on seasonal
gaps.
For credit, risk lowers average impacts of the program for a more basic reason – if
there is non-monetary punishment for default (that increases in the size of the default),
14It is important to note that, under more general utility functions, magnitudes of changes depend on
rates of change of marginal utilities (u′m, u′c). If individuals are close to food satiation, most changes will
be captured by non-food PCE. In other words, if u′m is initially steep but drops off rapidly (in comparison
to u′c), storage or credit could have greater sustained impacts on non-food consumption. A quasilinear
utility function helps demonstrate this point. Under such a utility function, in each period, the first
tranches of income will be allocated to food. If there are rises in income, those rises will be directed
towards non-food consumption.
11
individuals will borrow less in anticipation of a risky harvest. This reduced borrowing
will directly reduce the impact of credit on lean and harvest season consumption and,
unlike with storage, also reduce the impact of credit on the seasonal gap.This is because
the quantity borrowed cannot be adjusted based on the next season’s realized harvest.
Since maize is inherently subject to greater harvest failure than rice, we expect
relatively smaller effects of the programs for households that are predominantly maize-
producing.
2.5 Additional Hypotheses
We present some predictions that are beyond the scope of the model, but will be useful
for interpreting the data.







Anticipated & realized food shortage fall
L: fall
H: ambiguous
Possible drivers of employment and income are the following: (1) need, (2) health
/ productivity, (3) time available. In the lean season, storage reduces need while raising
productivity and available time (less time spent on food search). In the harvest season,
storage raises available time (less time gathering firewood and preparing for traditional
storage), but possibly also raises need and reduces health. We expect lean season health
to improve, with a possible worsening in harvest if reduced harvest season consump-
tion has marginal impacts on health. Anticipated shortages depend on how far into
the future individuals plan. If they do not actively plan for consumption beyond the
current agricultural cycle, it is unlikely that the storage program will have an impact on
predictions for distant seasons.
Under credit, drivers of employment and income move in the same qualitative di-
rections as under storage. Health consequences in the harvest season could be exac-
erbated if the individual overborrowed or if harvest failed. Potential lean season gains
from credit could be counterbalanced (or even outweighed) by worsened harvest season
12
outcomes, especially in the event of overborrowing (if agents are time-inconsistent) or
harvest failures.
Finally, as discussed above, it is reasonable to expect that households facing greater
social pressures to share will experience stronger program impacts. This could happen
from reduced visibility and reduced liquidity of assets, as well as other non-tangible
impacts that NGO presence could have on savings behavior. In particular, households
that spend significantly on gifts and non-household festivals might be particularly vul-
nerable to these social pressures. If so, such households face particularly acute saving
constraints and therefore stand to benefit more from the credit and storage programs.
3 Program Design
The treatments were implemented in September 2008 and lasted 3 years. The project
covers 96 rural villages in all 4 districts, or kabupatens, in West Timor. There are
unlikely to be contamination effects as the villages we cover are extremely rural– the
average distance to the closest market is 20.44 km and the average distance to the
closest subdistrict is 10 km. The objective of the pilot is to evaluate the impacts of
three scaleable programs – credit, storage, and contract storage (described below) –
relative to having no program at all.
Programs were randomly assigned in the following manner. First, 24 villages in
each of 4 districts were selected for the study. Within each district, 6 villages were ran-
domly selected to form the control group, while the remaining 18 were randomly as-
signed to one of the three treatment groups. The treatment programs were implemented
by two NGOs, Yayasan Alfa Omega and Yayasan Tanaoba Lais Manekat (TLM), each
of which operated independently in two districts. To be eligible for credit and stor-
age programs, the NGOs required participants to be married (or once-married) women
farmers.
Under the credit treatment, women’s microcredit groups of up to 108 women were
formed. Each member was offered loans of rice and maize during the lean season,
which were to be repaid in kind (with interest) during the following harvest. Repaid
grains were locally stored by the microcredit group and again distributed as loans dur-
ing the next lean season. An externally imposed loan ceiling ensured that participants
did not borrow unlimited amounts for the purposes of arbitrage. The program grant is
used as seed money to provide the first round of loans and repaid food (with interest) is
expected to sustain future loans. By participating in the credit program, the members
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are effectively getting access to a superior storage technology, for the use of which they
pay a fee in interest.
Like credit, the pure storage treatment is built on the hypothesis that the obstacle
to saving is based on lack of access to the technology. There are several storage tech-
nologies which, when implemented correctly, protect against rodents and moisture to
provide virtually loss-less storage of rice and maize. This is equivalent to significantly
raising the interest rate on savings.15 Individuals were offered storage materials (sacks
and jerry cans for small quantities, drums for larger quantities). There were no restric-
tions or conditions associated with use – people were free to deposit and withdraw at
any time.
The contract storage treatment used the same storage technology as the pure stor-
age treatment. However, individuals who chose to join were asked to commit to certain
aspects of a savings plan – in particular, that they would not withdraw their deposits
until a specified date early in the lean season. Violation of this agreement resulted in
denial of future access to the program. The goal of this treatment is to understand if
the current patterns of consumption are due to a lack of access to commitment products
as opposed to simply a lack of access to storage products. It is possible that individ-
uals need commitment both from their own future selves and from their friends and
neighbors. If the pure storage treatment is equivalent to a savings account with a high
interest rate, the contract storage treatment is equivalent to a term fixed deposit during
which savings are made illiquid.
If these programs were scaled up, we would expect lean season food prices to fall in
the long run. As our programs were small relative to the island population, we abstract
from these general equilibrium effects in our analysis.
We encountered a some obstacles during the early stages of implementation. First,
there were delays in procuring storage materials as they had to be purchased from
other islands. This meant that storage treatments in most areas started late in the third
survey round. An implication is that only rounds 4, 5, and 6 will likely pick up storage
treatment effects. Second, we found that the distinctions between pure and contract
storage were not strictly adhered to during implementation. For these reasons, we do
not distinguish the storage treatment from the contract treatment in this paper.16 Third,
15It is worth discussing why the women did not adopt these storage technologies before. Storage
equipment is not readily available in local markets. It took the NGOs some time before they could
locate a local supplier to transport the storage equipment to the villages. For the first year, materials
were purchased from other islands.
16We also repeated the empirical analysis treating pure and contract villages separately. There were
14
nine of the villages received a treatment that was different from the initial assignment.
These failures are accounted for in the empirical analysis. Finally, it is useful to keep
in mind that harvest failures in maize for an entire district (24 villages, or a quarter of
the sample) would have reduced the perceived effectiveness of credit.
4 Data
We collected a unique, large-scale seasonal household level panel where we surveyed
all 2,877 households twice each year for 3 years, once during the lean season and once
during the harvest season. All respondents are adult females who are knowledgeable
of household issues.
We collected four sets of statistics.17 First, we collected demographics such as age,
education and marital status. Second, we collected detailed recall data on food-related
measures including yields, ratio of produce stored, consumption and expenditure of
staple food items in the previous week.18
Third, we collected non-food measures of well-being including income in the past 3
months, annual and monthly per capita expenditures (PCE), recent employment, assets
and liabilities, and health outcomes.19 All of the survey questions for food-related
measures, income, employment and non-food expenditure items were taken directly
from Indonesia’s annual household survey, Susenas. All recall variables (including
income, PCE, consumption and expenditure) have been winsorized at the top 0.5% to
minimize biases due to outliers.
For expenditures, we also collected data on seasonal festival expenditures and how
much was spent on own and others’ festivities. Festival expenditures are important
and constitute 16% of total annual non-food expenditures. On average, 53% of festival
no differences between the two treatment groups.
17We also collected experimental and subjective measures of time-preferences. See Basu and Wong
(2008) for a discussion of the time preference data.
18We use the term consumption to refer to the the number of kilograms of food eaten by the household
in the past week. We also explored converting food intake into caloric intake. However, we decided to
stay with kilograms because the conversion from kilograms to calories would add another source of
measurement error. There is a wide variety of staples being consumed (different types of rice, maize,
tuber), each type likely to be associated with different caloric content. Our survey does not collect very
detailed information about these sub-categories of staples. We use the term expenditures to refer to the
total amount spent in the past week to purchase food.
19Our health outcomes are mostly self-reported health outcomes. We also collected objective data
such as arm circumference of pregnant women and children under the age of 5. but there were too few
of these individuals to use these variables in our regressons.
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expenditures is spent on festivities of others. Expenditures for own festivals include
expenditures for weddings (35%), religion (37%)20, and traditional ceremonies (11%)
whereas expenditures for others’ festivals include weddings (69%) and traditional cer-
emonies (25%). Fourth, we collected subjective data to understand how individuals
view their own economic futures. Respondents were asked to predict future prices and
anticipate imminent food shortages.
Figure 1 shows the timing of the surveys compared to the timing of the treatment
implementations. Because many of the villages were extremely rural, each round of
survey took approximately 2 months to complete. The first round was in the lean
season and was conducted between September and November 2008. The first two
harvest season surveys (rounds 2 and 4) were delayed by 3 months and only began in
July. This is 3 months after the typical harvest season for maize (April) and 1-2 months
after the harvest season for rice (May-June).
Due to the costs of household surveys, we only had enough funding to survey 30
households per village. In addition, hamlets within each village also tended to be
far apart. Our survey team could only focus on surveying households in 2 hamlets
per village. To increase the percent of surveyed households who would be offered
treatment, we first instructed the survey team to select 30 eligible households randomly
within 2 hamlets in both the treatment and control villages. Then, we instructed the
facilitators to offer all survey respondents in each village the option to participate.
Since the selection of survey respondents is still orthogonal to the selection of program
participants, the respondents in the treatment and control villages are still comparable,
on average. We test this using a large number of pre-treatment outcomes.
5 Seasonality patterns in the data
In this section, we analyze how a variety of household outcomes vary across seasons,
using data from control villages and also pre-treatment data in treated villages.21
First, seasonality in food-related outcomes appears small, especially compared to
seasonality in non-food expenditures and income. We take advantage of the house-
hold panel feature by estimating household fixed effect models. We regress household
outcomes on a harvest season dummy and household fixed effects. The coefficient on
the harvest season dummy tells us how much the harvest season differs from the lean
20This is most likely Christmas as a majority of respondents are either Protestant or Catholic.
21In this analysis, we only used control villages that had no treatment mis-assignment problem.
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season. Weekly food intake is 5.9% higher in the harvest season, and weekly food
expenditures are 5,000 Rupiahs lower during the harvest season (the median weekly
food expenditure is 27,000 Rupiahs). Food expenditures are naturally lower during the
harvest season because prices are lower and households can consume from their har-
vests. Monthly non-food expenditures are 22% higher during the harvest season and
quarterly income is 130,000 Rupiahs higher (the median quarterly income is 700,000
Rupiahs). All the estimates are significant at the 1% level (standard errors are clustered
at the household level).
Next, anxieties related to expected food shortages in the future and experiences
of food shortages in the past month are themselves seasonal. We asked households
whether they anticipate food shortage problems in the next November, January and
April. During the harvest season surveys, when households are planning how to allo-
cate their harvest across seasons, more than 33% of households anticipate facing food
shortages during the lean season but only 12% anticipate facing food shortages dur-
ing the harvest season. Moreover, during the harvest season, households are 11% less
likely to report lacking food in the previous month. Reported measures of food short-
ages are also very dynamic. Estimates of transition probabilities suggest that only 43%
of households that report lacking food in one period still report lacking food in the
next period. By contrast, 93% of households that report receiving Raskin rice in the
last period still report receiving Raskin rice in the next period, suggesting that the food
subsidy program does not adjust to seasonal food shortages.
To examine the absolute magnitude of seasonal differences, for each household, we
calculate the absolute difference between the harvest season and lean season outcomes
within each agricultural cycle.22 We do so for 3 measures of economic well-being:
quarterly income, weekly food and monthly non-food expenditures. In all 3 instances,
the absolute differences are at least 60% of the median levels. The median absolute dif-
ferences in quarterly household income, weekly food expenditures and monthly non-
food expenditures are 700,000 Rupiahs (median: 700,000 Rupiahs) , 22,000 Rupiahs
(median: 27,000 Rupiahs) and 10,000 Rupiahs (median: 17,000 Rupiahs) respectively.
While income, food and non-food expenditures vary considerably across seasons, in-
come seasonality is higher than expenditures for more than 90% of households. Over-
all, there is strong evidence of seasonal patterns in objective and subjective measures of
well-being, including income, non-food expenditures and self-reported food shortages
but less seasonality in weekly food consumption.
22We could not have constructed this measure without a seasonal household panel.
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Fourth, we ask households to predict what rice and maize prices would be in the
harvest and lean seasons. We find that they expect prices to vary for maize but not
so much for rice. The median expected price for maize in April (harvest) is 2500 Rp
compared to the median expected price in January (lean), 4000 Rp. For rice, the median
expected prices are 6000 Rp and 6500 Rp, respectively.
Finally, we replicated the analysis in Chaudhuri and Paxson (2002) using our sea-
sonal household panel. Using a household panel for 3 villages, they regressed income
shares, food and non-food expenditures on month fixed effects, and month fixed effects
interacted with an indicator for household types (eg. farm and non-farm households),
controlling for household characteristics that are constant in a year. The idea is to com-
pare household types who face different income streams and see whether they have dif-
ferent consumption patterns. They find evidence of differences in income seasonality
but no differences in consumption seasonality, suggesting that seasonality in expendi-
tures (food and non-food) does not track income seasonality. They conjecture that other
confounders they do not observe, such as seasonal preferences (festival expenditures)
or seasonal prices could be driving consumption seasonality.
We estimate a similar equation, comparing maize and rice farmers who face differ-
ent income streams due to the timing of the harvest seasons. Table 1 reports the results.
Column 1 controls for village fixed effects, columns 2 to 3 control for household fixed
effects and column 3 further controls for expected seasonal maize prices. All columns
also control for year fixed effects.23 The first 3 columns include all villages and the
next 3 columns include control and pre-treatment villages only.
Our results on non-food expenditures are similar to Chaudhuri and Paxson (2002)
but unlike them, we find seasonality in food related outcomes. Furthermore, proxies
for confounders such as festival expenditures or expectations of seasonal maize prices
cannot explain seasonality in food related outcomes. Panel A shows that maize and rice
farmers have different seasonal income patterns. Panels B and C show that maize and
rice farmers have different seasonal food consumption and expenditure patterns, but
Panels D and E show that they have no differences in seasonality of non-food expendi-
tures and festival expenditures. These effects are robust to controlling for expectations
of seasonal prices (columns 3 and 6).
To motivate the importance of seasonal household panels as opposed to seasonal
village panels, we compared the within household and within village time series vari-
23The years refer to agricultural years (beginning in the planting season and ending in the harvest
season). This year fixed effect absorbs omitted factors correlated with harvest shocks.
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ation in each. Using our household panel, we observe 6 estimates of quarterly income
for each household. We can calculate the standard deviation in income for each house-
hold. This gives us a distribution of 2,877 standard deviations, a statistic that measures
the amount of within household variation in income. The median of this statistic is
1,012,000 Rp. We then aggregated across households to construct a village panel that
tracks median income in the village across the 6 survey rounds. The corresponding
median standard deviation is only 425,000 Rupiah (42%). Therefore, village panels
that aggregate across households mask rich within household variation.
6 Empirics
Our main specification is an instrumental variable, cross-sectional regression that com-
pares treatment and control villages using post treatment data. We only compare credit
or storage to control groups but do not compare credit with storage. As shown in
the model, their effects on the budget constraints are different, making them harder to
compare.
yivd = δ0+δ1TAKEUPivd+θd+ εivd (2)
where yivd is the outcome for household i, in village v in district d. We use the
treatment assignments (TREATvd) to instrument for a dummy that is 1 if household i
participated in the programs (TAKEUPivd). All specifications control for district fixed
effects, θd , since treatment was assigned randomly across villages within each dis-
trict.24
To address the issue of having many outcomes, we follow (Kling et al., 2007) and
use mean effects analysis. We constructed a summary index for each category of out-
comes. That is, for each category with Y1, ...,YK outcomes, we calculated the standard-
ized outcomes, y1, ...,yK , by subtracting the outcome by the mean in the control group
in period 1 and dividing by the standard deviation in the control group in period 1.
24We report reduced form OLS regressions of outcomes on treatment assignment in Appendix A. In
Appendix B, we repeat IV regressions but control for the dependent variable in the baseline (round 1).
This specification controls for any pre-period differences that arise due to sampling error. Most results
were robust to adding round 1 controls (we will note if otherwise). We also tried estimating specifications
with household fixed effects and testing for differences between treatment and control groups. The
results were very noisy, possibly because panel data exacerbates the measurement error problem. Since
treatment was randomly assigned at the village level, the household fixed effect specification that uses
within household variation also loses much of the useful, between village variation.
19
Then, we totaled the standardized outcomes for all k standardized outcomes.
To avoid inconsistencies due to one NGO’s mis-assignment of villages to treatment
groups, we report all intent-to-treat and instrumental variable results using 2 samples.25
The first sample includes all 4 districts managed by both NGO’s, including villages
where assigned treatment was not the same as actual treatment. We also tried dropping
the 9 villages where assigned treatment was not the same as the implemented treatment
and the results were similar. The second sample includes only the two districts (48
villages) managed by Alfa Omega where there was no mis-assignment of treatment.
How the results are reported
We have 5 categories of outcomes. Our main outcomes relate to seasonality and
food shortage issues: seasonal differences (Panel A) and anticipated and reported short-
ages in food (Panel B). Under the standard utility functions such as CRRA, Cobb-
Douglas and log utility, we expect the treatments to reduce these outcomes but the
effect is ambiguous for more general utility functions, depending on the size of the
substitution and income effects. If we think the utility function is sufficiently concave,
we expect lower seasonal gaps to be associated with an improvement in welfare.26 We
also added 3 categories of outcomes that are commonly used in the literature on food
policy as proxies for well-being: health (Panel C), economic well-being (Panel D) and
food consumption and expenditures (Panel E).
It is also worth noting that the results using the 2 samples are quite different. In
most specifications, we found stronger treatment effects using Alfa Omega districts
only compared to estimates using the sample with both NGO’s. To our knowledge, Alfa
Omega experienced less of the implementation issues (such as harvest failures during
floods, late delivery of storage equipment) that could bias against finding treatment
effects. For completeness, we report and discuss estimates from both samples.
We report regressions that pool all post treatment data (rounds 2 to 6 for the Credit
treatment and rounds 3 to 6 for the Storage treatment), or all post treatment data in lean
seasons, or all post treatment data in harvest seasons.27 As shown in the model, some
treatment effects are expected for all seasons, and some treatment effects are expected
for lean or harvest seasons only. To avoid reporting multiple estimates for each de-
25Based on our investigation, we believe the mis-assignment error is orthogonal to unobserved village
characteristics. The treatment assignment was updated in the process of assigning treatments but one
NGO appeared to have used the older version of the treatment assignment. Results using both samples
are similar, suggesting that the misassignment error is not driving our results.
26We are careful not to make unambiguous welfare statements without estimating preferences.
27We also looked at treatment effects by rounds but this reduced the power significantly.
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pendent variable, when we discuss the results in the text, we report the coefficient for
all seasons when the treatment effects are robust across both harvest and lean seasons.
We report the coefficient for lean or harvest seasons only, otherwise. In the next two
sections, we report results for the credit treatment (Section 7) and the storage treatment
(Section 8).
7 Results for Credit
7.1 Check random assignment
Table C1 reports the OLS regression results using the first survey round. All regres-
sions include district fixed effects. Each cell in the table reports the coefficient on the
CREDIT dummy for one regression. With random assignment, we expect the treatment
and control villages to be similar on average, pre-treatment. The outcomes are orga-
nized into 5 panels: household characteristics (including education, age, ownership
of durables and livestock), subjective measures of food shortages, health, economic
well-being (including income, annual and monthly per capita expenditure), and food
(consumption and expenditures), agricultural production and storage.
Using all districts (Column 1), we see that 6 of the 34 coefficients are statistically
significant but are opposite sign from our results, so, these pre-characteristics tend to
bias us against our findings. Households in villages randomly assigned the credit treat-
ment are more likely to anticipate food shortages, report more days sick, have lower
food consumption and consume and store less maize as a share of staples. Only antic-
ipated food shortage in November is significant at the 5% level, the other coefficients
are either insignificant or significant at the 10% level.
Using Alfa Omega districts only (Column 2), more coefficients are significant than
using all districts, but the differences also bias against our results. Household heads in
villages offered the credit treatment are less likely to have graduated primary school.
Annual non-food PCE is 17% higher (10% sig.) and food expenditures are 23% more
likely to be zero in the past week (1% sig.). However, our main results are robust to
adding pre-treatment controls, suggesting that these pre-treatment differences cannot
explain our findings (See Appendix B). If anything, controlling for pre-treatment differ-




The Credit take-up rate is 40% using all four districts and 47% for Alfa Omega dis-
tricts only. The results from the first stage regression are reported in Appendix A.
Correspondingly, the instrumental variable estimates are about twice the magnitude of
the OLS estimates.
A low take up rate is not necessarily bad from a cost perspective. The main food
security program in Indonesia, Raskin, is a subsidized rice program that is extremely
costly because leakage is high. In our data, more than 90% of the households re-
port having received Raskin rice. This seems to be too high given our data on food
consumption. We calculated that as many as 40% of households consumed enough
calories (just from staples) to meet their daily energy requirements as defined by the
FAO, significantly lower than the share of households receiving Raskin rice.
7.3 Treatment effects by outcome categories
Objective measures of seasonal differences, |Harvest−Lean|
Panel A reports the seasonal gap in outcomes, calculated as absolute differences
across seasons within each cycle (|Harvest−Lean|). The first row of Panel A reports
the results using the summary index as a dependent variable. We calculated the sea-
sonal gap in log of food consumption in the past week, food expenditure in the past
week,28 log of income in the past 3 months and log of monthly non-food per capita
expenditures.29
Our main result suggests that the credit treatment reduced the seasonal gap, espe-
cially in Alfa Omega villages. Table C2 shows that the seasonal gap index is lower in
credit villages by 0.28 units (not sig.) in all districts and by 0.67 units (5% sig.) in Alfa
Omega districts, in spite of measurement error issues.30
28We did not use logs for weekly food expenditures to avoid censoring problems because 35% of
weekly food expenditures was 0.
29Monthly expenditures include rent, household items (soap, phonecards), health expenditures and
health insurance. Monthly expenditures make up 65% of total non-food expenditures. Annual ex-
penditures include annualized monthly expenditures, education, taxes, purchase of durables and also
expenditures on seasonal festivities.
30There are two sources of errors that would bias the estimates toward 0. First, we expect absolute
differences in these outcomes to exacerbate attenuation bias. Secondly, the harvest surveys were delayed
due to budget delays that were not related to field activities. The harvest season begins in April and
ends by June but the first two harvest season surveys were only conducted between July and August.
Therefore, some recall measures such as consumption in the past week would be an imperfect measure
of consumption in the harvest season due to the delay.
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The effect is strongest for weekly food expenditures for Alfa Omega districts (Table
C2). The credit treatment reduced the seasonal gap in weekly food expenditures by
21,000 Rupiahs (5% sig.). The effects are also economically significant. In the baseline
(round 1), the average weekly food expenditures is 37,000 Rupiahs (including 0 food
expenditures) and 52,000 Rupiahs (conditional on positive food expenditures). These
effects operate through the extensive margin of food expenditures. This alone does
not lend itself to a direct welfare interpretation. However, note that the likelihood of
households reporting zero food expenditures goes up in both seasons (Panel E) even
though there are no significant changes to food consumption. Taken together, this
points to the efficacy of credit in aiding a transfer of resources across seasons.
Finally, the coefficients on quarterly income and monthly non-food expenditure are
also negative.
Anticipated and reported shortages in food
Panel B reports results for anticipated food shortage issues in January, November
(lean seasons) and April (harvest for maize farmers, lean season for rice farmers) and
also reported experiences of food shortages (1 if the households lacked food in the
previous month).
Credit participants in all districts report a reduction of 0.83 units (not sig.) in the
subjective food shortage index using harvest season surveys and credit participants in
Alfa Omega districts report a reduction of 1.29 units (5% sig.). These anticipatory
effects are strongest during the harvest season surveys because this is is exactly when
the credit participants are making plans about how to allocate harvest (net of credit
repayment) across the seasons. Credit participants are also less likely to anticipate
food shortages in the harvest season (April), even though this is when repayment is
typically due.
Health
Panel C reports results for health outcomes. We have three health outcomes: (i)
an indicator for whether the household head reported any sickness, (ii) the number of
days the household head could not work due to sickness (includes 0’s if there were no
days affected) and (iii) an indicator for whether the household faced any shortages in
expenditures for health.
Health-related outcomes deteriorate during the harvest season, when repayment
is due, and improves during the lean season, when credit is being disbursed. Credit
participants in all districts report a reduction of 0.90 unit (5% sig.) in the health index
using harvest season surveys and an improvement in health of 1.48 units (10% sig.) in
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the lean season.
Using all districts (columns 1-3), household heads in credit villages are 10% (1%
sig.) more likely to report health expenditure shortages in the previous month and 17%
(1% sig.) more likely to report some sickness during the harvest season compared to
10% (not sig.) less in the lean season . However, they also report 15 fewer sick days
during the lean season (5% sig.) compared to 3 more sick days in the harvest season
(not sig.).
Economic well-being
Panel D reports outcomes related to economic well-being: log of income in the past
3 months, log of annual non-food per capita expenditure, an indicator that is 1 if the
household head reported any employment status in the past week.31
Credit participants in all districts report an improvement of 1.04 unit (1% sig.) in
the household well-being index in all seasons. A 1.04 standard deviation improvement
in household well-being is quite large. The results are significant for all, lean and
harvest season surveys but are strongest for the lean season surveys. Most of the effects
are due to income and reported employment. Income in credit villages are 69% higher
(10% sig.) during the harvest season. Using data on the sources of income, we find that
most of the increase in income is due to sale of harvest, rather than wages, remittances
or gifts. Reported employment is higher by 16% in the lean season (5% sig.). We do
not find any treatment effects on per capita expenditure.
Food consumption and expenditures
Panel E only reports estimates on the major food related measures: log of total
staple food consumption last week (rice plus maize consumption),32 log of total staple
food expenditures last week, an indicator that is 1 if food expenditures in the past week
was 0, expenditures per unit of consumption (ratio of food expenditure last week in
thousands of Rupiahs to food consumption last week),33 share of staple consumption
that is maize (calculated as maize consumption divided by maize+rice consumption).
31The question in the survey was “What was your employment status in the previous week? Choose
self-employed, self-employed with employees, wage workers.” We caution that this is not an exact mea-
sure of labor force participation and employment. We could not include a full module on employment
as the annual Indonesian household survey has.
32Due to the nature of recall data, we only asked how much households consumed in the previous
week. Since lean season surveys were conducted in December, and some credit disbursements were
made in January, some of these households may not have received their disbursements yet. This timing
could be one reason why there is no effect on food consumption.
33The unit for food consumption was kilogram. This ratio measures the thousands of Rupiahs spent
per kilogram of food consumed.
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There is no significant treatment effect on the food index, for all districts or Alfa Omega
districts (Table C2). There is a higher incidence of 0 food expenditures in all seasons
for Alfa Omega districts with no effect on consumption, leading to a reduction in rupi-
ahs spent per unit of food consumption.
7.4 Mechanisms
We examine two mechanisms that could explain the effects above.
Credit propensity
First, we show that the effects on seasonal differences (Panel A), health (Panel
C), and income (Panel D) are related to the propensity to have credit (Table C3). We
calculate the average amount of debt a household had in the past 6 months divided
by the average income (both debt and income are averaged across rounds 1 and 2).
High credit households are households whose debt-to-income ratio are strictly above
the median debt-to-income.34
High credit households in Alfa Omega districts report a 1.10 unit (1% sig.) reduc-
tion in the seasonal gap index compared to a reduction of 0.55 units (10% sig.) for
low credit households. While both types of households experience a reduction in the
seasonal gap, not surprisingly, it is households with a higher propensity to use credit
in the baseline who are able to use credit to reduce seasonal differences. This differ-
ential impact is robust to controlling for proxies of wealth such as assets (livestock,
motorcycle) and quarterly income.
Both types of households report higher quarterly income but high credit households
report between 32% to 55% higher income (mostly from sales of harvest) than low
credit households. These could be households who have high returns to capital. With
the credit program, they do not have to save their harvest for consumption in the lean
season anymore. Instead, they can use the sales revenue for other investments. This
could explain why income is higher for these households in all seasons but income is
only higher for low credit households during the harvest season.
The perverse effects on health in the harvest season also appears to be related to
34Debt-to-income is commonly used to measure credit exposure. High debt-to-income households
could be households who have access to credit (eg. entrepreneurs) or poor households who are debt-
laden. Only 20% of households report positive debt-to-income and debt-to-income does not seem pro-
hibitively high for these households (the median debt-to-income for households with positive debt is
only 12%). Using data from control villages and village fixed effect regressions, we find that high credit
households within a village have higher per capita expenditures, quarterly income and weekly food
consumption. We conclude that these high credit households are more likely to be entrepreneurs.
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credit exposure. High debt-to-income households in Alfa Omega districts are more
likely to report some sickness and report shortages in health expenditures, but only
during the harvest season. This is consistent with the theory that credit could lead to
worse effects on reported health in the harvest season due to the burden of having to
repay during the harvest season. The differential impact on the health of high credit
households only operates in the harvest season because this burden is more pronounced
during the harvest season and for households with higher debt-to-income ratios. In the
lean season, when health improves, high credit households do not report better health
outcomes than low credit households. There is no differential treatment effect on high
credit households for subjective shortages (Panel B).
Harvest risk
We also find that the effects on seasonal gap (Panel A) and subjective shortages
(Panel B) are related to differences in harvest risk (Table C4). We compared maize
farmers (high harvest risk) to rice farmers (low harvest risk).
As discussed in the model, the treatment effects on seasonal differences would be
weaker for credit participants facing more harvest risk because they may borrow less.
Indeed, we find that rice farmers report a 0.80 unit (1% sig.) reduction in the seasonal
gap index but maize farmers report a smaller reduction (0.11 unit, 1% sig.).
The effect on subjective measures of food shortage also shows that the treatment
effect on lean season consumption is larger if the harvest risk is smaller. Accordingly,
rice farmers in all districts report a reduction of 1.08 unit (5% sig.) of the subjective
shortage index in the harvest season but maize farmers only report a reduction of 0.09
units (10% sig.). These differential impacts appear to be due to differences in harvest
risks, and not differences in wealth. In the baseline survey, maize farmers do not report
higher quarterly income, more livestock nor motorcycles than rice farmers.
It is surprising that maize farmers in all districts are 10.3% more likely to report
lacking food in the previous month during harvest season surveys (1% sig.). However,
maize farmers in Alfa Omega districts are 4.4% less likely to report lacking food in the
previous month using harvest season surveys (1% sig.), indicating that the 10.3% effect
is more likely due to the other two districts where maize farmers experienced harvest
failures. There is no differential treatment effect on maize versus rice farmers for other
categories of outcomes.
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8 Results for Storage
8.1 Check random assignment
Table S1 reports the regression results using the first survey round. Using all districts
(Column 1), we find that 5 of the 34 coefficients are significant. Households in villages
randomly assigned the storage treatment own 0.54 more motorcycles (5% sig.), report
3 more sick days (1% sig.), are 2.8% less likely to be employed (5% sig.), consume
9.8% less food in the past week (5% sig.) and consume less maize (5% sig.). These
results are opposite sign than our findings, so, bias us against our results.
Using Alfa Omega districts only (Column 2), households in storage villages are
less likely to have completed primary school (5% sig.) are more likely to report zero
food expenditures in the past week (5% sig.), produce 91kg more rice (10% sig.). All
our results are robust to adding pre-treatment controls (see Appendix B).
8.2 Take up
The storage take-up rate is 42% for all districts and 49% for Alfa Omega districts. We
report these results in Appendix A (Table S1.A).
8.3 Treatment effects by outcome categories
As discussed in Section 3, the storage equipment only arrived in round 3. Therefore,
we only report results using 3 post-treatment rounds (rounds 4 to 6) here. We present
results for regressions using all post-treatment rounds in Appendix C. Table S2 reports
overall IV results for the storage treatment and Table S3 reports the results for high
versus low storage households. We first calculate the average amount of maize and
rice produced and stored (averaged over rounds 1 and 2), and calculate storage propen-
sity as (average rice stored + average maize stored)/(average rice produced + average
maize produced). High storage households are households with above-median stor-
age propensity. As discussed in Section 2, we expect stronger treatment effects for
households who save in-kind.
Seasonal gap
We did not find treatment effects on the seasonal gap index, but the gap in seasonal
food expenditures did fall by 20,000 Rupiahs (5% sig.) for Alfa Omega districts. This
could be because we only had 1 observation of seasonal gap, |Round4−Round5|.
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Anticipated and reported shortages in food
All households report a reduction in the subjective food shortage index by 1.33
units (10% sig.) and high storage households report a reduction in the subjective food
shortage index by 2.11 units (1% sig.) in the lean season. Unlike the credit treatment,
these effects on subjective shortages are stronger in the lean season for storage be-
cause households have to wait till the lean season to observe benefits from the storage
equipment. Moreover, for high storage households, we find a statistically significant
reduction in each component of the subjective shortage index: anticipation of food
shortages in January, April and November as well as likelihood to report lacking food
in the previous month. These effects are statistically and economically more significant
than the effects for the credit treatment.
Health
There is a slight deterioration of health outcomes in the harvest season for Alfa
Omega villages. Households are 6.5% more likely to report health expenditure short-
ages in the harvest season (10% sig.). High storage households in Alfa Omega districts
are 8% less likely to report health expenditure shortages in the lean season (10% sig.)
and high storage households in Alfa Omega report 1.3 fewer sick days (5% sig.) in the
lean season.
Economic well-being
High and low storage households in all districts report higher economic well-being
in the harvest season (0.97 unit for all households, significant at 5%). These effects
appear to be driven by higher annual non-food expenditure for storage participants. The
results are similar for Alfa Omega districts. For the credit treatment, economic well-
being also increased about the same magnitude, but the effects were mostly driven by
higher quarterly income and reported employment and there was no effect on non-food
expenditure.
Food consumption and expenditures
We do not find treatment effects for the food index.
8.4 Mechanisms
Reduction in social gifts
The need to contribute to neighbors’ festival expenditures could be a source of
savings constraint. Storage participants could circumvent this savings constraint by
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committing to store harvest for the lean season. To test this, we calculate the share of
a household’s annual festival expenditures that is used for their neighbors’ festivities.
We find that storage participants report an 10.2% reduction in this share for all districts
(not sig.) and a 25.1% reduction in Alfa Omega districts (1% sig.).
Harvest risk
Table S4 shows that maize and rice farmers have differential treatment effects for
seasonal differences (Panel A), subjective shortages (Panel B) and economic well-
being (Panel D). The seasonal gap is 0.76 units lower for rice farmers in Alfa Omega
districts (5% sig.) but the effect is small and only slightly negative for maize farmers.
For all districts, the gap is 0.87 units larger for maize farmers (1% sig.). This larger
gap is due to increases in food expenditure gaps and income gaps. The fact that it is
only larger for maize farmers in all districts but not for maize farmers in Alfa Omega
districts suggest that the increase in the seasonal differences could be due to differ-
ences between the implementation by the two NGO’s. Differences in harvest risk also
affect subjective shortages (Panel B) and economic well-being (Panel D), for the same
reasons as the credit treatment. Rice farmers report a reduction in anticipated food
shortages by 1.11 to 2.46 units but maize farmers only report a small reduction. The
economic well-being index increases between 1.43 to 1.61 units for rice farmers but
the effects are smaller for maize farmers.
9 Discussion of results
Tables C5 and S5 summarize the key results. We can be confident that the significant
coefficients are not driven by hitches in implementation. As noted above, our results
are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of mis-assigned villages. Also, since
we stratified by district while assigning treatments and control, harvest failures do not
bias results. Our findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of the model, but
warrant further scrutiny.
The most notable non-result is consumption of maize and rice. While this is in-
teresting, it is not implausible for a combination of two reasons. First, the data on
consumption recall are noisy and subject to measurement error. Second, it is possible
that marginal utilities associated with the consumption of staples diminish more rapidly
than marginial utilities of other forms of consumption. In our model, the generalized
utility function is agnostic on this, but more specific functional form assumptions (such
as quasilinear utility, a reasonable conjecture in this setting) could explain this pattern.
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It is also noteworthy that credit participants do not report increases in non-food
per-capita expenditure. Storage, if adopted, raises the size of the pie to be split across
the year. This is not necessarily the case with credit. Finally, while we would expect
stronger results for maize than rice (given that storage problems are more acute for
maize), we observe the opposite pattern. This is possibly attributable to widespread
harvest failures in maize-producing regions. With little maize available at harvest,
storage improvements are unlikely to have an impact. Also, the fact that rice farmers
also report a benefit from storage drums suggest that the benefit may not just be an
improvement in the physical storage technology, but perhaps also a lower pressure to
spend on neighbor’s festivities. Similarly, harvest failures generate additional repay-
ment pressures on maize-producing households, which could counteract the potential
lean-season benefits of credit.
10 Cost benefit analysis
10.1 Credit
To measure the cost effectiveness of the credit program, we follow a standard approach
that allows us to benchmark our program against other food policies.35 We calculate the
numerator of the benefits-to-program cost ratio as the cost savings (to the household),
of consuming 1kg of maize in the lean season. The cost savings are the difference
in cost that the household has to pay under the credit program versus a counterfac-
tual (saving from the previous harvest36). Under the credit program, this cost is 2763
Rupiah.37
The counterfactual cost depends on the physical loss rates. The table below shows
that at a 30% loss rate, the counterfactual cost is 3571 Rp.38 At a 40% loss rate,
it is more profitable to save in cash and buy maize in the lean season, so the coun-
35Another method would treat part of the program cost as transfers that are valued by the participants.
The cost to the program, then, would be the deadweight cost from raising funds.
36Another counterfactual could involve informal credit. Anecdotal evidence suggests that interest
rates from these forms of credit are high. Using this counterfactual would increase the cost savings due
to our credit program.
37Borrowing 1 kg of maize in December must be repaid with interest (10.5% over four months) in the
harvest season. At a harvest season price of 2,500 Rupiahs/kg, the repayment amount is valued at 2,763
Rupiah. This is the median expected price reported in Section 4.
38At a 30% loss rate, a household needs to store 1.43 kg of maize during harvest, which costs 1.43 kg
* 2500 Rupiahs/kg = 3571 Rp in foregone revenue from sales.
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terfactual cost is 4000 Rp.39 Therefore, the cost savings are 808 Rp and 1237 Rp
respectively.40 The last row of the table takes into account the time value of money in
that the credit program delays the cost (repayment is 4 months after December) and
the counterfactual requires foregoing revenue in the previous harvest (8 months be-
fore December). We follow the literature and assume an annual discount rate of 10%.
In-kind depreciation rates Notes 30% 40%
Maize needed in previous harvest to deliver 1kg in December [1] 1kg(1−loss) 1.43 kg 1.67 kg
Counterfactual cost [2] min([1]∗2500Rp/kg,4000Rp) 3571 Rp 4000 Rp
Cost to deliver 1kg under credit program [3] 2500Rp∗1.105 2763 Rp 2763 Rp
Cost savings [4] [2]− [3] 808 Rp 1,237 Rp
Cost savings (time value of money, 10% discount rate): [5] 1,316 Rp 1,371 Rp
We calculate the denominator of the benefits-to-program cost ratio in 3 ways. Our
first estimate is 3979 Rp, an average over 3 years.41 Our second estimate is 1013
Rp, assuming the program lasts forever.42 Our third estimate assumes the program
lasted 5 or 10 years, so that the program cost is amortized (using a 10% discount rate).
The annual program costs are 3149 Rp and 1943 Rp respectively. The table below
summarizes the cost benefit analysis.
39With cash, the proceeds from selling 1 kg of maize in the harvest season (2500 Rupiahs) would buy
0.63 kg of maize in the lean season (at 4000 Rupiahs per kg). This represents an expected depreciation
rate of 38% (less than the physical loss rates of 40%). Therefore, the counterfactual cost is just the price
of maize in the lean season.
40Calculated as 3571 Rp - 2763 Rp = 808 Rp (at 30% loss rates) and 4000 Rp-2763 Rp=1237 Rp (at
40% loss rates).
41Over three years, the total cost of the program was 2.5 billion Rupiahs. This includes the cost of
procuring and delivering the food and the cost to facilitate the program. Since a credit village typically
represented 1/3 of the responsibility of each facilitator, we calculate the facilitation cost of credit by
dividing the total facilitator cost by 3. This way, the facilitator cost for credit was 646,511,605 Rp over
3 years or 215,503,868 Rp per year. A total of 638,391 kg of food was delivered. 3979 Rp is calculated
as 2.5 billion Rp/638391kg.
42This assumes that all the “fixed cost” is amortized away because the credit cycles are repeated.
There is no need to procure food for the subsequent years. The only cost would be the facilitator’s cost
(215,503,868 Rp). In principle, part or all of the facilitator cost could also decrease over time, as the
community members take over more of the responsibilities, but we wanted to be conservative. 1013 Rp
is calculated as 215,503,868 Rp divided by 212,797 kg of food delivered per year.
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No discount rates With discount rates
30% 40% 30% 40%
3 years (no amortization) 20% 35% 29% 45%
5 years 26% 45% 36% 57%
10 years 42% 72% 59% 92%
Forever 80% 139% 113% 176%
Our benefits-to-program cost ratio ranges from 20% to 176% depending on the
assumptions above. As a benchmark, Tabor (2005) estimates that the transfer benefit
per unit cost for Raskin is 61% for all beneficiaries and 52% for targeted beneficiaries.
The second number assumes a leakage rate of 16% (a well-known problem of food
subsidies is that not all transfers benefit eligible households). The 52% estimate could
be an over-estimate (The World Bank (2005) estimates that only 18% of the Raskin
budget translates into a subsidy for poor households).
There are a couple of caveats to this analysis. First, the cost of credit to the house-
hold is uncertain (if there was a harvest failure, the unpaid interest would accrue over
time) whereas the subsidized price the household has to pay in Raskin is roughly con-
stant. Adjusted for risk, the cost to the household from credit could be higher. However,
we argue that this added risk does not constitute a high cost because most participants
were allowed to stay in the program as long as there was no evidence of strategic de-
fault. Also, there could be general equilibrium effects. With a scale-up, prices in the
lean season could fall. This reduces the cost to operate the program since a large part
of the cost is incurred in the lean season but it also reduces the cost savings from credit.
On net, the impact on the cost-effectiveness is unclear.
10.2 Storage
For the storage program, we calculate the returns to investment on storage drums. Con-
sider a household that saves a portion of the harvest in April for consumption in De-
cember. This can be done with or without drums. If they stored their maize in drums,
the value of the stored maize would be 648,000 Rp in December.43 With drums, the
participant invests 250,000 Rupiahs to purchase a drum to store 180 kg of maize. There
43Assuming a depreciation rate of 10%, in December, the value of the stored maize would be 648,000
Rp (Calculated as 180 kg * 4000 Rp/kg * (1-0.1)). Anecdotal evidence from participants suggest that
the depreciation rates with storage drums were less than 10%.
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is also an opportunity cost of this equity of 16,667 Rp.44
Without drums, the household could store in cash or in-kind. Assuming in-kind
depreciation rates of 30%, the value of the maize stored in-kind in December would be
504,000 Rp.45 Therefore, the “profit” from storing maize in drums would be 127,333
Rp.46 This represents 51% returns to investment.
As above, this analysis ignores general equilibrium effects. As the program scales
up, more households would store in maize, expanding the supply in the lean season,
and in turn dampening the lean season price. This will lower, but not eliminate, rela-
tive benefits from storage (drums will still raise physical retention, but at a lower lean
season Rupiah value).
11 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze seasonal food consumption and expenditure patterns in West
Timor. We develop a model that shows that food shortages in the lean season in Timor
cannot be explained by pure borrowing constraints. Our model shows that access to
credit and savings both narrow the gap of inter-seasonal marginal utilities.
We utilize a unique seasonal household panel to study seasonal patterns and to
credibly evaluate the cost-effectiveness of two food programs that adjust according to
seasons. Our paper contributes to the literature on food policy and also the literature
on consumption and income seasonality. On the latter, we validate the findings of
Chaudhuri and Paxson (2002), that seasonality of consumption in non-food expendi-
tures does not appear to track seasonality of income. However, our household fixed
effect regression shows that maize and rice farmers who face different income streams
appear to have different seasonal patterns for food consumption and expenditure. Our
findings cannot be explained by expected differences in seasonal prices or differences
in seasonal festivities.
Under credit, participants report a reduction in both seasonal consumption gaps and
food shortage, increases in economic well-being, and health improvements when credit
is disbursed but deterioration when repayments are due. Under storage, households
with a high propensity to save report a reduction in food shortages and an increase in
44We assume a return to equity of 10%, leading to an opportunity cost of 16,667 Rupiahs for the
investment of 250,000 Rp to buy the drums.
45Calculated as 180kg*(1-loss rate)*4000 Rp/kg.
46Calculated as 648,000 Rp - 16,667 Rp - 504,000 Rp.
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economic well-being.
In the future, we plan to combine time preference data with these program effects
as we expect treatment effects would be heterogeneous depending on time preferences,
as alluded to in the theoretical framework. There is an inherent problem with measure-
ments of time preferences that rely solely on tradeoffs over money. We have measured
preferences using both money (actual payouts) and perishable consumption goods (hy-
pothetical). By comparing responses to both types of questions, we hope to disentangle
true time inconsistency from other factors such as credit constraints and social pres-
sures, and understand how each type of agent responds to our food security programs.
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Figure 1: Timeline of surveys and treatment by year and month
SURVEY Credit Storage Contract
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Panel A: ln(Income in the Past Quarter)
Harvest 0.1762*** 0.1568*** 0.1842*** 0.2608*** 0.2791*** 0.2112***
(0.0277) (0.0327) (0.0370) (0.0425) (0.0611) (0.0689)
Harvest*Maize Farmers ‐0.2012*** ‐0.1781*** ‐0.1510*** ‐0.3170*** ‐0.3565*** ‐0.3130***
(0.0330) (0.0423) (0.0421) (0.0483) (0.0800) (0.0787)
ln(Expected Maize Price in a Season) 0.0955*** ‐0.0429
(0.0337) (0.0686)
N 15794 15794 15214 7871 7871 7546
R‐squared 0.1013 0.2982 0.3096 0.1027 0.3588 0.3691
Panel B: ln(Food Consumption in the Past Week)
Harvest 0.0439*** 0.0044 ‐0.0114 ‐0.0167 ‐0.0502** ‐0.0438
(0.0149) (0.0159) (0.0208) (0.0193) (0.0251) (0.0313)
Harvest*Maize Farmers 0.1084*** 0.1631*** 0.1737*** 0.1225*** 0.1707*** 0.1974***
(0.0203) (0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0231) (0.0318) (0.0324)
ln(Expected Maize Price in a Season) ‐0.0067 0.0620**
(0.0251) (0.0311)
N 16317 16317 15695 8347 8347 7976
R‐squared 0.1343 0.2896 0.298 0.1777 0.4797 0.4798
Panel C: Food Expenditures in the Past Week (000's)
Harvest ‐8.5448*** ‐6.8078*** ‐7.6580*** ‐13.7481*** ‐11.9752*** ‐11.9681***
(0.7867) (0.9143) (1.0833) (1.1255) (1.5547) (1.8659)
Harvest*Maize Farmers 8.0693*** 5.3682*** 4.8818*** 11.2286*** 8.4774*** 7.3622***
(0.9734) (1.1713) (1.2469) (1.3027) (1.9014) (1.9780)
ln(Expected Maize Price in a Season) 0.4477 ‐0.3965
(1.0138) (1.8046)
N 17262 17262 16047 8622 8622 8124
R‐squared 0.1342 0.3228 0.3406 0.1519 0.4523 0.4615
Panel D: ln(Monthly Non‐food Expenditures)
Harvest 0.3050*** 0.2602*** 0.2643*** 0.2012*** 0.1481*** 0.1269***
(0.0172) (0.0188) (0.0217) (0.0247) (0.0309) (0.0372)
Harvest*Maize Farmers ‐0.0346 0.0345 0.0379 ‐0.0530* 0.0281 0.0342
(0.0216) (0.0231) (0.0239) (0.0302) (0.0382) (0.0401)
ln(Expected Maize Price in a Season) 0.015 ‐0.0231
(0.0204) (0.0380)
N 15609 15609 15025 7786 7786 7444
R‐squared 0.2465 0.5207 0.5259 0.2007 0.6024 0.6007
Panel E: ln(Festival Expenditures)
Harvest ‐0.2646*** ‐0.2952*** ‐0.2882*** ‐0.1727*** ‐0.2074*** ‐0.2239**
(0.0365) (0.0486) (0.0569) (0.0500) (0.0777) (0.0963)
Harvest*Maize Farmers ‐0.0761* ‐0.0476 ‐0.0439 ‐0.1270** ‐0.1215 ‐0.1093
(0.0439) (0.0624) (0.0646) (0.0591) (0.1005) (0.1050)
ln(Expected Maize Price in a Season) 0.0208 0.0086
(0.0541) (0.1073)
N 10840 10840 10448 6156 6156 5886
R‐squared 0.0966 0.3578 0.3649 0.1175 0.53 0.5266
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Village Y N N Y N N
Household N Y Y N Y Y












1(Graduated primary school) ‐0.0091 (0.0307) ‐0.0777* (0.0379)
1(Graduated lower secondary school) ‐0.0029 (0.0283) ‐0.0008 (0.0407)
Age ‐2.7425 (1.9284) ‐2.0246 (2.6008)
Number of chickens owned ‐0.1052 (0.3596) ‐0.0187 (0.4894)
Number of cows owned 0.2431 (0.3271) 0.0218 (0.4719)
Number of pigs owned 0.0183 (0.1351) ‐0.0403 (0.1591)
Number of motorcycles owned 0.335 (0.2050) ‐0.0947 (0.2217)
Panel B: Anticipated and Reported Measures of Food Shortages
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) 0.0951* (0.0513) 0.0483 (0.0631)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) 0.0894 (0.0535) 0.0397 (0.0694)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) 0.0703** (0.0341) 0.1019** (0.0453)
1(Lacked food last month) 0.0552 (0.0554) 0.0687 (0.0778)
Panel C: Health
1(Health expenditure shortages) 0.0048 (0.0292) 0.0041 (0.0439)
Number of days affected 2.7840* (1.4520) 5.2198** (2.4107)
Reported any sickness 0.021 (0.0376) 0.0532 (0.0491)
Panel D: Household Well‐being
Log(Income in the past 3 months) 0.2627 (0.3030) 0.56 (0.5908)
Log(Per‐capita annual non‐food expenditure) 0.0617 (0.0719) 0.1679* (0.0962)
1 (any type of employment) ‐0.0199 (0.0123) ‐0.0318* (0.0177)
Panel E: Food Consumption and Expenditures
log(Food consumption last week, in mok) ‐0.0771* (0.0455) ‐0.0604 (0.0689)
log(Food expenditure last week) 0.072 (0.0777) 0.0787 (0.1447)
1(Food expenditure was 0) 0.0623 (0.0536) 0.2281*** (0.0714)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption 0.2182 (0.3461) ‐0.4518 (0.5369)
Share of consumption that is maize last week ‐0.0550* (0.0274) ‐0.0765* (0.0427)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week ‐0.0093 (0.0295) 0.033 (0.0548)
PanePanel F: Agricultural yields and storage
Amount of maize produced (kg) ‐4.4214 (29.0953) ‐22.4436 (26.4347)
Amount of maize stored (kg) ‐8.3823 (5.6075) ‐15.1402** (6.8477)
Amount of rice produced (kg) ‐13.1704 (44.9455) 122.2978* (68.5923)
Amount of rice stored (kg) 6.9815 (12.4893) 39.1369* (21.8189)
Ratio of rice stored ‐0.0247 (0.0388) ‐0.0228 (0.0452)
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Subjective Food Shortage Index ‐0.5179 ‐0.0544 ‐0.8269 ‐1.0262* ‐0.6311 ‐1.2896**
(0.5059) (0.6725) (0.5425) (0.5388) (0.7783) (0.5703)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) ‐0.0961 ‐0.0421 ‐0.1321* ‐0.1071 ‐0.1091 ‐0.1057
(0.0820) (0.1120) (0.0801) (0.0978) (0.1386) (0.0923)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) ‐0.0216 0.0085 ‐0.0417 ‐0.0646** ‐0.0212 ‐0.0935**
(0.0299) (0.0446) (0.0385) (0.0324) (0.0478) (0.0372)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) ‐0.0515 0.0553 ‐0.1226* ‐0.1123 ‐0.0399 ‐0.1606**
(0.0660) (0.1074) (0.0735) (0.0713) (0.1315) (0.0807)
1(Lacked food last month) ‐0.0392 ‐0.0787 ‐0.0129 ‐0.1308* ‐0.0997 ‐0.1515
(0.0672) (0.0739) (0.0834) (0.0772) (0.0854) (0.0955)
Panel C: Health
Health Index 0.0559 1.4835* ‐0.8958** 0.0651 1.8685* ‐1.1371***
(0.4121) (0.7983) (0.4011) (0.4865) (0.9686) (0.4356)
1(Health expenditure shortages) 0.0564* ‐0.0144 0.1035*** 0.0427 ‐0.0006 0.0715*
(0.0317) (0.0395) (0.0372) (0.0341) (0.0388) (0.0420)
Number of days affected ‐4.3254 ‐14.9353** 2.7479 ‐3.4107 ‐18.7778** 6.8341*
(3.2597) (7.3830) (3.3620) (4.0060) (8.9424) (3.9112)
Reported any sickness 0.061 ‐0.1019 0.1697*** 0.0411 ‐0.1503 0.1687***
(0.0593) (0.0930) (0.0604) (0.0670) (0.1154) (0.0628)
Panel D: Household Well‐being
Household Well‐Being Index 1.0374*** 1.0791** 1.0096** 1.0476** 0.9252 1.1292**
(0.3713) (0.4616) (0.4174) (0.5069) (0.6157) (0.4839)
Log(Income in the past 3 months) 0.5614** 0.385 0.6845* 0.4231** 0.3206 0.4923***
(0.2672) (0.2657) (0.3593) (0.1783) (0.2529) (0.1815)
Log(Annual non‐food expenditure, 1,000 Rp) 0.1546 0.0125 0.2476 0.1356 ‐0.0444 0.257
(0.1539) (0.1834) (0.1715) (0.1489) (0.2020) (0.1682)
1 (any type of employment) 0.1339** 0.1614** 0.1081 0.1399 0.1371* 0.1426
(0.0597) (0.0689) (0.0695) (0.0851) (0.0753) (0.1002)
Panel E: Food Consumption and Expenditures
Food Index 0.0362 ‐0.0704 0.1073 ‐0.0052 ‐0.4947 0.3211
(0.4758) (0.4882) (0.6296) (0.4626) (0.5031) (0.5619)
log(Food consumption last week, in mok) 0.2093 ‐0.0598 0.3869 0.0806 ‐0.0131 0.1428
(0.1787) (0.1304) (0.2766) (0.1249) (0.1335) (0.1370)
log(Food expenditure last week) ‐0.3598 0.0177 ‐0.6104 ‐0.5033* ‐0.6289 ‐0.4202
(0.3698) (0.3968) (0.5269) (0.2783) (0.4423) (0.2819)
1(Food expenditure was 0) 0.203 0.22 0.1917 0.5261*** 0.5050*** 0.5402***
(0.1278) (0.1388) (0.1415) (0.1771) (0.1801) (0.1993)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption ‐1.0416 ‐0.4072 ‐1.4736* ‐2.9949*** ‐2.6950*** ‐3.1958***
(0.8232) (1.0341) (0.8454) (0.9925) (1.0404) (1.0918)
Share of consumption that is maize last week ‐0.0403 ‐0.0456 ‐0.0375 ‐0.0956** ‐0.1350*** ‐0.0692
(0.0383) (0.0392) (0.0458) (0.0479) (0.0464) (0.0549)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week ‐0.0543 ‐0.0924 ‐0.0314 0.0963 0.0579 0.1193










Season: All Lean Harvest All Lean Harvest























Subjective Food Shortage Index ‐0.5144 0.0058 ‐0.8612 ‐0.9499* ‐0.4565 ‐1.2789**
(0.5112) (0.6604) (0.5555) (0.5428) (0.7332) (0.5943)
Subjective Food Shortage Index_High Credit ‐0.0164 ‐0.2814 0.1603 ‐0.3504 ‐0.8024 ‐0.049
(0.3946) (0.6075) (0.3992) (0.3518) (0.6903) (0.3321)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) ‐0.0875 ‐0.0283 ‐0.127 ‐0.0864 ‐0.0863 ‐0.0865
(0.0842) (0.1124) (0.0821) (0.1017) (0.1391) (0.0958)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January)_High Credit ‐0.0402 ‐0.0647 ‐0.0239 ‐0.0949 ‐0.1047 ‐0.0884
(0.0619) (0.0926) (0.0633) (0.0735) (0.1211) (0.0695)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) ‐0.0209 0.0073 ‐0.0397 ‐0.0659** ‐0.0125 ‐0.1015***
(0.0303) (0.0430) (0.0405) (0.0336) (0.0488) (0.0383)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April)_High Credit ‐0.0032 0.0056 ‐0.0091 0.0058 ‐0.0401 0.0364
(0.0220) (0.0404) (0.0319) (0.0172) (0.0332) (0.0228)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) ‐0.0552 0.0645 ‐0.1351* ‐0.108 ‐0.0099 ‐0.1734**
(0.0668) (0.1082) (0.0761) (0.0732) (0.1283) (0.0860)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November)_High Credit 0.0177 ‐0.0429 0.058 ‐0.02 ‐0.1377 0.0585
(0.0589) (0.0937) (0.0623) (0.0593) (0.1082) (0.0576)
1(Lacked food last month) ‐0.0418 ‐0.0783 ‐0.0175 ‐0.1222 ‐0.0977 ‐0.1385
(0.0677) (0.0762) (0.0820) (0.0771) (0.0880) (0.0964)
1(Lacked food last month)_High Credit 0.0121 ‐0.002 0.0214 ‐0.0395 ‐0.009 ‐0.0599
(0.0551) (0.0828) (0.0687) (0.0390) (0.0920) (0.0402)
Panel C: Health
Health Index 0.1798 1.4559* ‐0.6710* 0.1445 1.8913* ‐1.0200***
(0.4016) (0.7973) (0.3435) (0.4777) (0.9711) (0.3816)
Health Index_High Credit ‐0.5788 0.1289 ‐1.0506 ‐0.3649 ‐0.105 ‐0.5383
(0.5171) (0.6080) (0.7624) (0.4160) (0.2369) (0.6065)
1(Health expenditure shortages) 0.044 ‐0.0048 0.0765** 0.0292 ‐0.0021 0.0501
(0.0300) (0.0400) (0.0335) (0.0325) (0.0379) (0.0379)
1(Health expenditure shortages)_High Credit 0.0577 ‐0.0452 0.1263* 0.0617* 0.0068 0.0983**
(0.0357) (0.0349) (0.0655) (0.0322) (0.0322) (0.0470)
Number of days affected ‐5.3572 ‐15.1147** 1.1478 ‐3.2735 ‐18.6269** 6.9621*
(3.3268) (7.4555) (3.0673) (3.9915) (8.9803) (3.6625)
Number of days affected_High Credit 4.8214 0.8383 7.4767 ‐0.6303 ‐0.6933 ‐0.5883
(5.3051) (7.7930) (7.5924) (4.1217) (1.8816) (6.3536)
Reported any sickness 0.0582 ‐0.0951 0.1604*** 0.0177 ‐0.1638 0.1387**
(0.0598) (0.0938) (0.0601) (0.0668) (0.1116) (0.0598)
Reported any sickness_High Credit 0.0133 ‐0.0318 0.0434 0.1076** 0.062 0.1380**
(0.0494) (0.0715) (0.0646) (0.0419) (0.0694) (0.0639)
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Panel D: Household Well‐being
Household Well‐Being Index 1.0113*** 1.1141** 0.9428** 0.9384* 0.8936 0.9683**
(0.3660) (0.4632) (0.4132) (0.4983) (0.6162) (0.4699)
Household Well‐Being Index_High Credit 0.122 ‐0.1636 0.3125 0.5018 0.1452 0.7395
(0.3374) (0.3799) (0.3548) (0.4764) (0.5319) (0.5118)
Log(Income in the past 3 months) 0.4936* 0.3131 0.6200* 0.3094* 0.2045 0.3808**
(0.2718) (0.2666) (0.3679) (0.1723) (0.2416) (0.1704)
Log(Income in the past 3 months)_High Credit 0.3234** 0.3457* 0.3059* 0.5319*** 0.5470** 0.5192***
(0.1514) (0.2057) (0.1846) (0.1563) (0.2537) (0.1938)
Log(Annual non‐food expenditure, 1,000 Rp) 0.1341 0.0099 0.2159 0.0998 ‐0.0265 0.1852
(0.1624) (0.1927) (0.1777) (0.1678) (0.2163) (0.1854)
Log(Annual non‐food expenditure, 1,000 Rp)_High Credit 0.0953 0.0122 0.1464 0.1645 ‐0.0826 0.3291
(0.1379) (0.1525) (0.1675) (0.1817) (0.1637) (0.2402)
1 (any type of employment) 0.1396** 0.1720** 0.1087 0.136 0.1354* 0.1364
(0.0603) (0.0701) (0.0710) (0.0855) (0.0751) (0.1013)
1 (any type of employment)_High Credit ‐0.0263 ‐0.0488 ‐0.0026 0.018 0.0074 0.0285
(0.0458) (0.0516) (0.0445) (0.0555) (0.0559) (0.0588)
Panel E: Food Consumption and Expenditures
Food Index ‐0.168 ‐0.2533 ‐0.1111 ‐0.0789 ‐0.5522 0.2366
(0.4543) (0.5048) (0.6042) (0.4631) (0.5058) (0.5641)
Food Index_High Credit 0.9541** 0.8546 1.0204* 0.3386** 0.2642 0.3883**
(0.4109) (0.6385) (0.5428) (0.1588) (0.3065) (0.1835)
log(Food consumption last week, in mok) 0.1654 ‐0.0608 0.3152 0.0472 ‐0.0346 0.1019
(0.1592) (0.1339) (0.2404) (0.1289) (0.1422) (0.1385)
log(Food consumption last week, in mok)_High Credit 0.2068 0.0045 0.3381 0.1551* 0.0993 0.1906**
(0.1807) (0.1129) (0.2728) (0.0933) (0.1199) (0.0895)
log(Food expenditure last week) ‐0.3976 0.044 ‐0.69 ‐0.4333* ‐0.5322 ‐0.3664
(0.4044) (0.3855) (0.5888) (0.2551) (0.4119) (0.2646)
log(Food expenditure last week)_High Credit 0.1742 ‐0.1244 0.3609 ‐0.3291 ‐0.4842 ‐0.243
(0.2850) (0.2365) (0.3925) (0.3026) (0.5408) (0.3421)
1(Food expenditure was 0) 0.2110* 0.2185 0.206 0.5318*** 0.5019*** 0.5518***
(0.1257) (0.1398) (0.1400) (0.1777) (0.1847) (0.1989)
1(Food expenditure was 0)_High Credit ‐0.0372 0.0069 ‐0.0666 ‐0.0261 0.0145 ‐0.0532
(0.0755) (0.0863) (0.0857) (0.0880) (0.1012) (0.0985)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption ‐1.1804 ‐0.8183 ‐1.4296* ‐2.8792*** ‐2.4819** ‐3.1444***
(0.7657) (0.8653) (0.8307) (0.9660) (1.0306) (1.0689)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption_High Credit 0.6539 1.9332 ‐0.2077 ‐0.5369 ‐0.9854 ‐0.2393
(1.0757) (2.3245) (0.5195) (0.4959) (0.6730) (0.5770)
Share of consumption that is maize last week ‐0.0536 ‐0.0586 ‐0.0508 ‐0.1037** ‐0.1448*** ‐0.0762
(0.0384) (0.0404) (0.0461) (0.0487) (0.0478) (0.0548)
Share of consumption that is maize last week_High Credit 0.0627** 0.0611** 0.0628** 0.0376 0.0452* 0.0325
(0.0259) (0.0285) (0.0301) (0.0254) (0.0244) (0.0297)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week ‐0.0582 ‐0.0958 ‐0.0356 0.0675 0.0154 0.1002
(0.0559) (0.0772) (0.0546) (0.0593) (0.0544) (0.0844)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week_High Credit 0.0179 0.0163 0.0193 0.1352 0.2130* 0.0863













Season: All Lean Harvest All Lean Harvest























Subjective Food Shortage Index ‐1.0768** ‐0.4705 ‐1.4810*** ‐1.2036** ‐0.6662 ‐1.5619***
(0.5177) (0.7932) (0.4962) (0.5863) (0.9007) (0.5552)
Subjective Food Shortage Index_Maize 0.9891* 0.7364 1.1576** 0.5494 0.1085 0.8433**
(0.5539) (0.8640) (0.5114) (0.4153) (0.7580) (0.4020)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) ‐0.1191 ‐0.1053 ‐0.1283 ‐0.1117 ‐0.1258 ‐0.1023
(0.1009) (0.1484) (0.0880) (0.1147) (0.1682) (0.1008)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January)_Maize 0.0406 0.1119 ‐0.0068 0.0143 0.0519 ‐0.0108
(0.0990) (0.1524) (0.0823) (0.0914) (0.1460) (0.0680)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) ‐0.0455 ‐0.0009 ‐0.0752** ‐0.0670* ‐0.0217 ‐0.0973**
(0.0324) (0.0547) (0.0344) (0.0350) (0.0558) (0.0384)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April)_Maize 0.0423 0.0165 0.0594 0.0076 0.0017 0.0116
(0.0348) (0.0526) (0.0423) (0.0209) (0.0420) (0.0200)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) ‐0.1282* ‐0.0088 ‐0.2077*** ‐0.1404* ‐0.0337 ‐0.2115***
(0.0661) (0.1288) (0.0665) (0.0756) (0.1487) (0.0746)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November)_Maize 0.1358* 0.1135 0.1506* 0.0869 ‐0.0191 0.1576**
(0.0712) (0.1380) (0.0799) (0.0542) (0.1180) (0.0772)
1(Lacked food last month) ‐0.1375* ‐0.0977 ‐0.1639* ‐0.1646** ‐0.1075 ‐0.2026**
(0.0728) (0.0841) (0.0858) (0.0829) (0.0931) (0.0974)
1(Lacked food last month)_Maize 0.1738** 0.0336 0.2673*** 0.1046** 0.0242 0.1582***
(0.0739) (0.0830) (0.0897) (0.0432) (0.0602) (0.0513)
Panel C: Health
Health Index 0.3304 1.8197** ‐0.6626* 0.185 1.9563* ‐0.9959**
(0.4846) (0.8826) (0.3685) (0.5393) (1.0090) (0.3876)
Health Index_Maize ‐0.4857 ‐0.5951 ‐0.4128 ‐0.3712 ‐0.272 ‐0.4373
(0.4354) (0.8205) (0.5535) (0.3862) (0.7750) (0.8338)
1(Health expenditure shortages) 0.0357 ‐0.0303 0.0796* 0.0488 ‐0.0052 0.0848*
(0.0334) (0.0387) (0.0419) (0.0366) (0.0427) (0.0459)
1(Health expenditure shortages)_Maize 0.0366 0.0281 0.0423 ‐0.019 0.0142 ‐0.0412
(0.0384) (0.0424) (0.0510) (0.0232) (0.0277) (0.0328)
Number of days affected ‐6.3764 ‐17.1620** 0.814 ‐4.99 ‐19.3358** 4.5738
(4.0509) (8.1805) (3.3495) (4.4533) (9.3190) (3.5391)
Number of days affected_Maize 3.6297 3.9406 3.4225 4.89 1.7276 6.9982
(3.8565) (8.0661) (4.8452) (4.3401) (7.3359) (8.4979)
Reported any sickness 0.0385 ‐0.1508 0.1647*** 0.0373 ‐0.1634 0.1711**
(0.0656) (0.1051) (0.0635) (0.0745) (0.1222) (0.0667)
Reported any sickness_Maize 0.0398 0.0865 0.0087 0.0118 0.0405 ‐0.0074
(0.0610) (0.0978) (0.0707) (0.0406) (0.1028) (0.0749)
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Panel D: Household Well‐being
Household Well‐Being Index 1.3666*** 1.3047** 1.4079*** 1.3764** 1.2341* 1.4713***
(0.5138) (0.6143) (0.4964) (0.5859) (0.7034) (0.5564)
Household Well‐Being Index_Maize ‐0.5826 ‐0.3993 ‐0.7048 ‐1.0182** ‐0.9565* ‐1.0592**
(0.4843) (0.5630) (0.5227) (0.4922) (0.4986) (0.5037)
Log(Income in the past 3 months) 0.6189*** 0.4973* 0.7018*** 0.5090** 0.3812 0.5940***
(0.2242) (0.2943) (0.2477) (0.2216) (0.3105) (0.2227)
Log(Income in the past 3 months)_Maize ‐0.1021 ‐0.1991 ‐0.0308 ‐0.2646 ‐0.1835 ‐0.3171
(0.2976) (0.2963) (0.3976) (0.1862) (0.2338) (0.1949)
Log(Annual non‐food expenditure, 1,000 Rp) 0.195 0.0041 0.3204* 0.1631 ‐0.0456 0.3036
(0.1682) (0.2077) (0.1934) (0.1810) (0.2313) (0.2074)
Log(Annual non‐food expenditure, 1,000 Rp)_Maize ‐0.0717 0.0149 ‐0.1294 ‐0.084 0.0037 ‐0.1423
(0.1866) (0.2021) (0.2162) (0.1433) (0.1321) (0.1878)
1 (any type of employment) 0.1858** 0.1922** 0.1800* 0.1944** 0.1870** 0.2015*
(0.0836) (0.0801) (0.0950) (0.0947) (0.0869) (0.1089)
1 (any type of employment)_Maize ‐0.0918 ‐0.0541 ‐0.1281 ‐0.1671** ‐0.1533** ‐0.1810**
(0.0756) (0.0882) (0.0801) (0.0704) (0.0717) (0.0716)
Panel E: Food Consumption and Expenditures
Food Index 0.0846 ‐0.3448 0.3709 0.0854 ‐0.4878 0.4676
(0.4658) (0.5273) (0.5523) (0.5168) (0.5746) (0.6145)
Food Index_Maize ‐0.0856 0.4857 ‐0.4664 ‐0.2808 ‐0.0215 ‐0.4536
(0.5221) (0.5440) (0.6886) (0.3241) (0.3880) (0.3956)
log(Food consumption last week, in mok) 0.1536 ‐0.0644 0.2967* 0.1099 ‐0.0065 0.1866
(0.1406) (0.1401) (0.1696) (0.1432) (0.1543) (0.1546)
log(Food consumption last week, in mok)_Maize 0.0991 0.0081 0.1607 ‐0.09 ‐0.0201 ‐0.1355
(0.2056) (0.1605) (0.3240) (0.1165) (0.1272) (0.1254)
log(Food expenditure last week) ‐0.6399 ‐0.4619 ‐0.7723 ‐0.8224** ‐0.8743* ‐0.7860*
(0.4013) (0.4502) (0.5199) (0.3801) (0.4866) (0.4632)
log(Food expenditure last week)_Maize 0.3853 0.6931* 0.2163 0.6328* 0.5335 0.6873
(0.3847) (0.3867) (0.5210) (0.3362) (0.3550) (0.4281)
1(Food expenditure was 0) 0.5956*** 0.5236*** 0.6436*** 0.7292*** 0.6580*** 0.7767***
(0.1241) (0.1611) (0.1209) (0.1325) (0.1781) (0.1286)
1(Food expenditure was 0)_Maize ‐0.6948*** ‐0.5374*** ‐0.7997*** ‐0.6289*** ‐0.4738*** ‐0.7324***
(0.1388) (0.1628) (0.1462) (0.1860) (0.1475) (0.2264)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption ‐3.3594*** ‐2.6910*** ‐3.8068*** ‐4.2495*** ‐3.8106*** ‐4.5417***
(0.8376) (1.0258) (0.8752) (0.8790) (1.0448) (0.9528)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption_Maize 4.1199*** 4.0491*** 4.1547*** 3.8630*** 3.4096*** 4.1652***
(0.9494) (1.2547) (0.9564) (0.8896) (0.9699) (0.9848)
Share of consumption that is maize last week ‐0.1043** ‐0.0987** ‐0.1083** ‐0.1229** ‐0.1405** ‐0.1113**
(0.0454) (0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0519) (0.0566) (0.0538)
Share of consumption that is maize last week_Maize 0.1137** 0.0941* 0.1261** 0.0843 0.0168 0.1302*
(0.0521) (0.0537) (0.0633) (0.0634) (0.0554) (0.0726)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week 0.1262 0.0167 0.2102 0.2258* 0.102 0.3173*
(0.1106) (0.0726) (0.1633) (0.1254) (0.0784) (0.1808)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week_Maize ‐0.2482** ‐0.1576* ‐0.3224* ‐0.2569** ‐0.0959 ‐0.3719**










































1(Graduated primary school) ‐0.0007 (0.0303) ‐0.0809** (0.0320)
1(Graduated lower secondary school) 0.0362 (0.0316) 0.0228 (0.0412)
Age 1.1763 (3.0626) 1.4096 (3.6757)
Number of chickens owned 0.1765 (0.3337) 0.11 (0.4622)
Number of cows owned 3148.2929 (3449.1864) ‐0.3406 (0.2495)
Number of pigs owned ‐0.1324 (0.1135) ‐0.0597 (0.0922)
Number of motorcycles owned 0.5352** (0.2245) ‐0.0335 (0.2104)
Panel B: Anticipated and Reported Measures of Food Shortages
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) 0.0415 (0.0487) 0.0273 (0.0612)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) 0.0463 (0.0521) 0.0175 (0.0716)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) 0.0134 (0.0261) ‐0.0136 (0.0366)
1(Lacked food last month) ‐0.0248 (0.0502) ‐0.0316 (0.0679)
Panel C: Health
1(Health expenditure shortages) 0.0075 (0.0260) ‐0.0143 (0.0349)
Number of days affected 3.0808*** (1.1350) 3.3561*** (1.2221)
Reported any sickness 0.0417 (0.0342) 0.0893* (0.0469)
Panel D: Household Well‐being
Log(Income in the past 3 months) 0.1733 (0.2959) 0.4921 (0.5588)
Log(Per‐capita annual non‐food expenditure) 0.0604 (0.0655) 0.0197 (0.0897)
1 (any type of employment) ‐0.0280** (0.0112) ‐0.0282* (0.0150)
Panel E: Food Consumption and Expenditures
log(Food consumption last week, in mok) ‐0.0976** (0.0466) ‐0.1337** (0.0594)
log(Food expenditure last week) 0.0784 (0.0650) 0.0528 (0.0975)
1(Food expenditure was 0) 0.0368 (0.0465) 0.1213** (0.0580)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption 0.5458 (0.3398) 0.4136 (0.5423)
Share of consumption that is maize last week ‐0.0574** (0.0261) ‐0.0894** (0.0393)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week ‐0.031 (0.0247) ‐0.0246 (0.0412)
PanePanel F: Agricultural yields and storage
Amount of maize produced (kg) 4.5254 (24.5730) ‐6.5918 (25.0350)
Amount of maize stored (kg) ‐1.7645 (5.6986) ‐8.9804 (6.1302)
Amount of rice produced (kg) ‐10.5889 (34.8907) 91.2188* (46.5709)
Amount of rice stored (kg) ‐1.4532 (7.3718) 13.8583 (11.4385)
Ratio of rice stored ‐0.0321 (0.0414) ‐0.0099 (0.0557)










Season: All Lean Harvest All Lean Harvest













Subjective Food Shortage Index ‐0.5915 ‐1.3327* ‐0.2209 ‐0.5931 ‐1.6279 ‐0.0757
(0.3838) (0.7805) (0.4546) (0.4055) (1.1402) (0.4343)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) ‐0.0507 ‐0.1888 0.0183 ‐0.0241 ‐0.2989 0.1133
(0.0753) (0.1374) (0.0904) (0.0855) (0.1917) (0.1061)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) ‐0.0118 ‐0.0603 0.0124 ‐0.0318 ‐0.0664 ‐0.0145
(0.0311) (0.0388) (0.0315) (0.0417) (0.0512) (0.0410)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) ‐0.0875* ‐0.1228 ‐0.0698 ‐0.0539 ‐0.108 ‐0.0268
(0.0481) (0.1062) (0.0623) (0.0512) (0.1607) (0.0596)
1(Lacked food last month) ‐0.0788 ‐0.1773* ‐0.0295 ‐0.1422* ‐0.216 ‐0.1052
(0.0603) (0.0985) (0.0622) (0.0762) (0.1324) (0.0687)
Panel C: Health
Health Index 0.1207 0.417 ‐0.0274 ‐0.113 0.4354 ‐0.3871
(0.2448) (0.2957) (0.2846) (0.3092) (0.4071) (0.3282)
1(Health expenditure shortages) 0.0034 ‐0.052 0.0311 0.0288 ‐0.0435 0.0650*
(0.0261) (0.0376) (0.0272) (0.0355) (0.0563) (0.0342)
Number of days affected ‐0.3545 ‐0.7172 ‐0.1732 0.4839 ‐2.2345 1.8431
(1.5111) (1.1376) (2.2064) (1.8678) (1.5393) (2.6838)
Reported any sickness ‐0.044 ‐0.0943 ‐0.0189 ‐0.0021 ‐0.0589 0.0262
(0.0501) (0.0845) (0.0518) (0.0626) (0.1025) (0.0645)
Panel D: Household Well‐being
Household Well‐Being Index 0.8070** 0.4752 0.9729** 0.6592 0.3965 0.7905
(0.4029) (0.4286) (0.4614) (0.4850) (0.5452) (0.5732)
Log(Income in the past 3 months) 0.5035 0.422 0.5475 0.138 0.224 0.0963
(0.3578) (0.2897) (0.4723) (0.2498) (0.3354) (0.2617)
Log(Annual non‐food expenditure, 1,000 Rp) 0.3961** 0.3814* 0.4040*** 0.3322** 0.3364 0.3308**
(0.1606) (0.2311) (0.1555) (0.1680) (0.3063) (0.1442)
1 (any type of employment) 0.032 ‐0.0201 0.0855 0.0412 ‐0.0283 0.1131
(0.0568) (0.0255) (0.1017) (0.0910) (0.0317) (0.1683)
Panel E: Food Consumption and Expenditures
Food Index 0.0125 ‐0.0343 0.0359 ‐0.2686 ‐0.573 ‐0.1163
(0.3374) (0.4581) (0.3772) (0.4630) (0.4549) (0.5589)
log(Food consumption last week, in mok) 0.2181 ‐0.0957 0.3745 ‐0.0458 ‐0.1253 ‐0.0065
(0.2002) (0.1378) (0.2707) (0.1278) (0.1534) (0.1297)
log(Food expenditure last week) ‐0.4709 0.1435 ‐0.7302 ‐0.254 ‐0.1821 ‐0.2899
(0.3621) (0.3599) (0.4577) (0.2336) (0.2833) (0.2624)
1(Food expenditure was 0) 0.1556 0.2180* 0.1244 0.2896** 0.2487 0.3101**
(0.1009) (0.1256) (0.1139) (0.1374) (0.1720) (0.1518)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption ‐0.6866 ‐0.7933 ‐0.6361 ‐1.7510** ‐1.6104 ‐1.8211*
(0.7531) (0.9180) (0.8370) (0.8860) (1.1252) (1.0214)
Share of consumption that is maize last week ‐0.0488 ‐0.0516 ‐0.0476 ‐0.0774* ‐0.1056** ‐0.0636
(0.0345) (0.0457) (0.0361) (0.0402) (0.0523) (0.0391)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week 0.0111 ‐0.0017 0.0175 0.0892** 0.0908* 0.0908**










Season: All Lean Harvest All Lean Harvest























Subjective Food Shortage Index ‐0.2891 ‐0.6151 ‐0.1262 ‐0.2393 ‐0.6628 ‐0.0275
(0.3949) (0.7684) (0.4609) (0.4394) (1.1321) (0.4694)
Subjective Food Shortage Index_High Storage ‐0.6308** ‐1.4972*** ‐0.1976 ‐0.7642*** ‐2.0846*** ‐0.1041
(0.2715) (0.4284) (0.3025) (0.2909) (0.5613) (0.2570)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) 0.0077 ‐0.0677 0.0454 0.0398 ‐0.1528 0.1361
(0.0764) (0.1381) (0.0934) (0.0930) (0.1976) (0.1152)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January)_High Storage ‐0.1218** ‐0.2525*** ‐0.0564 ‐0.1380** ‐0.3156*** ‐0.0493
(0.0527) (0.0820) (0.0578) (0.0579) (0.1137) (0.0559)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) ‐0.0028 ‐0.0342 0.0129 ‐0.0139 ‐0.0251 ‐0.0083
(0.0320) (0.0425) (0.0318) (0.0446) (0.0600) (0.0421)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April)_High Storage ‐0.0188 ‐0.0544* ‐0.001 ‐0.0387* ‐0.0893** ‐0.0134
(0.0181) (0.0311) (0.0176) (0.0231) (0.0444) (0.0193)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) ‐0.0525 ‐0.0493 ‐0.054 ‐0.017 0.0059 ‐0.0284
(0.0512) (0.1044) (0.0647) (0.0590) (0.1615) (0.0699)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November)_High Storage ‐0.0731** ‐0.1534*** ‐0.0329 ‐0.0798** ‐0.2460*** 0.0034
(0.0338) (0.0552) (0.0464) (0.0380) (0.0763) (0.0456)
1(Lacked food last month) ‐0.0625 ‐0.1086 ‐0.0395 ‐0.1198 ‐0.1363 ‐0.1115
(0.0598) (0.1018) (0.0608) (0.0755) (0.1355) (0.0696)
1(Lacked food last month)_High Storage ‐0.0339 ‐0.1434** 0.0209 ‐0.0484 ‐0.1723** 0.0136
(0.0428) (0.0716) (0.0454) (0.0483) (0.0812) (0.0520)
Panel C: Health
Health Index ‐0.0681 0.3398 ‐0.272 ‐0.1895 0.3981 ‐0.4833
(0.2850) (0.2964) (0.3510) (0.3832) (0.4209) (0.4347)
Health Index_High Storage 0.3939 0.1611 0.5103 0.1653 0.0805 0.2077
(0.2668) (0.2276) (0.3573) (0.3904) (0.2569) (0.5174)
1(Health expenditure shortages) 0.0161 ‐0.0276 0.038 0.0386 ‐0.0146 0.0653*
(0.0279) (0.0396) (0.0297) (0.0386) (0.0585) (0.0387)
1(Health expenditure shortages)_High Storage ‐0.0265 ‐0.0510** ‐0.0143 ‐0.0213 ‐0.0625** ‐0.0007
(0.0196) (0.0259) (0.0234) (0.0258) (0.0312) (0.0301)
Number of days affected 0.3907 ‐0.95 1.061 0.2605 ‐3.0018** 1.8916
(1.9018) (1.1018) (2.7949) (2.3320) (1.4532) (3.3981)
Number of days affected_High Storage ‐1.5547 0.4856 ‐2.5749 0.4825 1.6573* ‐0.1048
(1.9773) (0.8848) (2.8997) (2.7002) (0.9220) (3.9415)
50
Reported any sickness ‐0.0033 ‐0.0815 0.0358 0.0273 ‐0.05 0.0659
(0.0531) (0.0866) (0.0563) (0.0742) (0.1145) (0.0738)
Reported any sickness_High Storage ‐0.0850* ‐0.0266 ‐0.1142** ‐0.0636 ‐0.0191 ‐0.0858
(0.0499) (0.0619) (0.0578) (0.0693) (0.0790) (0.0784)
Panel D: Household Well‐being
Household Well‐Being Index 0.6496* 0.2364 0.8562* 0.5264 0.0401 0.7695
(0.3875) (0.3950) (0.4413) (0.4859) (0.4774) (0.5787)
Household Well‐Being Index_High Storage 0.3284 0.4983* 0.2434 0.2868 0.7699** 0.0453
(0.2407) (0.2769) (0.2873) (0.2892) (0.3853) (0.3590)
Log(Income in the past 3 months) 0.4219 0.2627 0.5049 0.1054 0.0243 0.1491
(0.3154) (0.2733) (0.4105) (0.2205) (0.3115) (0.2325)
Log(Income in the past 3 months)_High Storage 0.171 0.3340* 0.0892 0.0703 0.4295* ‐0.114
(0.1837) (0.1926) (0.2160) (0.1897) (0.2548) (0.1912)
Log(Annual non‐food expenditure, 1,000 Rp) 0.2666* 0.1486 0.3259** 0.2142 0.0427 0.3009**
(0.1440) (0.2063) (0.1408) (0.1546) (0.2641) (0.1415)
Log(Annual non‐food expenditure, 1,000 Rp)_High Storage 0.2676* 0.4847** 0.1608 0.2503* 0.6250** 0.0633
(0.1396) (0.2026) (0.1369) (0.1516) (0.2935) (0.1250)
1 (any type of employment) 0.0413 ‐0.0029 0.086 0.0555 ‐0.0067 0.1185
(0.0545) (0.0246) (0.0983) (0.0875) (0.0286) (0.1642)
1 (any type of employment)_High Storage ‐0.0191 ‐0.0354 ‐0.001 ‐0.0305 ‐0.0463 ‐0.0114
(0.0387) (0.0266) (0.0626) (0.0603) (0.0340) (0.1032)
Panel E: Food Consumption and Expenditures
Food Index 0.0279 0.0529 0.0155 ‐0.0998 ‐0.2872 ‐0.0061
(0.3306) (0.4088) (0.3762) (0.4710) (0.4379) (0.5712)
Food Index_High Storage ‐0.0322 ‐0.1819 0.0427 ‐0.3645 ‐0.6174* ‐0.238
(0.2084) (0.3735) (0.2229) (0.2599) (0.3713) (0.2851)
log(Food consumption last week, in mok) 0.1098 ‐0.1105 0.2193 ‐0.0177 ‐0.1194 0.0324
(0.1466) (0.1390) (0.1824) (0.1266) (0.1614) (0.1267)
log(Food consumption last week, in mok)_High Storage 0.2253 0.0311 0.3216 ‐0.0599 ‐0.0127 ‐0.0827
(0.1683) (0.0930) (0.2415) (0.0777) (0.1117) (0.0717)
log(Food expenditure last week) ‐0.2336 0.1786 ‐0.393 ‐0.1732 ‐0.0792 ‐0.2108
(0.2417) (0.3196) (0.2845) (0.2308) (0.2659) (0.2606)
log(Food expenditure last week)_High Storage ‐0.4862 ‐0.0703 ‐0.6987 ‐0.1778 ‐0.2148 ‐0.178
(0.3518) (0.2531) (0.4813) (0.1935) (0.2397) (0.2151)
1(Food expenditure was 0) 0.1748 0.2621** 0.1311 0.2896* 0.2813 0.2938
(0.1103) (0.1335) (0.1243) (0.1566) (0.1793) (0.1793)
1(Food expenditure was 0)_High Storage ‐0.04 ‐0.092 ‐0.014 0 ‐0.0705 0.0352
(0.0710) (0.0901) (0.0814) (0.1166) (0.1247) (0.1310)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption ‐0.8194 ‐1.1215 ‐0.6691 ‐1.7811* ‐1.7147 ‐1.8146
(0.7341) (0.9219) (0.8197) (0.9468) (1.1681) (1.1103)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption_High Storage 0.2763 0.6893 0.0685 0.0643 0.2241 ‐0.0138
(0.5639) (0.6849) (0.6094) (0.6963) (0.7433) (0.8020)
Share of consumption that is maize last week ‐0.0361 ‐0.0318 ‐0.0386 ‐0.055 ‐0.0739 ‐0.0461
(0.0357) (0.0443) (0.0366) (0.0460) (0.0550) (0.0456)
Share of consumption that is maize last week_High Storage ‐0.0264 ‐0.0416 ‐0.0188 ‐0.0478 ‐0.0682 ‐0.037
(0.0273) (0.0401) (0.0317) (0.0377) (0.0478) (0.0411)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week 0.0038 0.009 0.0027 0.0655** 0.1081* 0.0498
(0.0362) (0.0687) (0.0341) (0.0326) (0.0582) (0.0371)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week_High Storage 0.0149 ‐0.0214 0.0305 0.052 ‐0.0362 0.0924













Season: All Lean Harvest All Lean Harvest























Subjective Food Shortage Index ‐1.5610*** ‐2.4644** ‐1.1092** ‐1.2356*** ‐2.9317** ‐0.3875
(0.4699) (1.0194) (0.5228) (0.4545) (1.2722) (0.4875)
Subjective Food Shortage Index_Maize 1.4030*** 1.6378** 1.2856*** 1.1124*** 2.2574*** 0.54
(0.4035) (0.7029) (0.4537) (0.3792) (0.8125) (0.3641)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January) ‐0.1558 ‐0.3742** ‐0.0466 ‐0.0593 ‐0.4739** 0.1479
(0.1000) (0.1778) (0.1248) (0.1088) (0.2106) (0.1412)
1(Anticipate food shortage in January)_Maize 0.1521* 0.2683** 0.094 0.061 0.3030** ‐0.06
(0.0861) (0.1351) (0.1057) (0.0859) (0.1418) (0.1094)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April) ‐0.0416 ‐0.0711* ‐0.0269 ‐0.0556 ‐0.0978** ‐0.0344
(0.0313) (0.0421) (0.0322) (0.0398) (0.0486) (0.0399)
1(Anticipate food shortage in April)_Maize 0.0431** 0.0157 0.0568** 0.0411* 0.0544 0.0344
(0.0218) (0.0313) (0.0274) (0.0242) (0.0339) (0.0263)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November) ‐0.2054*** ‐0.2182* ‐0.1989*** ‐0.1624*** ‐0.2618 ‐0.1127*
(0.0531) (0.1307) (0.0645) (0.0505) (0.1726) (0.0602)
1(Anticipate food shortage in November)_Maize 0.1706*** 0.1380* 0.1869*** 0.1879*** 0.2662*** 0.1487***
(0.0433) (0.0806) (0.0509) (0.0458) (0.0954) (0.0435)
1(Lacked food last month) ‐0.2131*** ‐0.3586*** ‐0.1404* ‐0.2162** ‐0.3762** ‐0.1362*
(0.0762) (0.1295) (0.0779) (0.0856) (0.1548) (0.0798)
1(Lacked food last month)_Maize 0.1944*** 0.2624*** 0.1605** 0.1281** 0.2772** 0.0536
(0.0585) (0.1002) (0.0629) (0.0520) (0.1120) (0.0501)
Panel C: Health
Health Index 0.2333 0.6447* 0.0276 ‐0.1164 0.4468 ‐0.3981
(0.3240) (0.3838) (0.3697) (0.3574) (0.4416) (0.3794)
Health Index_Maize ‐0.163 ‐0.3295 ‐0.0797 0.006 ‐0.0198 0.0189
(0.2532) (0.2859) (0.3268) (0.2906) (0.2325) (0.3970)
1(Health expenditure shortages) ‐0.0161 ‐0.0702 0.011 0.0222 ‐0.0491 0.0578
(0.0333) (0.0496) (0.0336) (0.0395) (0.0613) (0.0378)
1(Health expenditure shortages)_Maize 0.0282 0.0264 0.0291 0.0115 0.0096 0.0124
(0.0221) (0.0356) (0.0253) (0.0239) (0.0393) (0.0296)
Number of days affected ‐0.3345 ‐0.5324 ‐0.2356 0.7322 ‐1.4994 1.848
(2.0681) (1.5824) (3.0005) (2.2451) (1.8927) (3.1723)
Number of days affected_Maize ‐0.0289 ‐0.2675 0.0904 ‐0.4299 ‐1.2728 ‐0.0084
(2.1135) (1.2074) (3.1034) (2.6956) (1.1423) (3.9424)
52
Reported any sickness ‐0.0706 ‐0.1781* ‐0.0168 ‐0.0015 ‐0.0831 0.0393
(0.0707) (0.1081) (0.0746) (0.0706) (0.1104) (0.0738)
Reported any sickness_Maize 0.0384 0.1213 ‐0.0031 ‐0.0011 0.042 ‐0.0226
(0.0536) (0.0801) (0.0573) (0.0418) (0.0661) (0.0449)
Panel D: Household Well‐being
Household Well‐Being Index 1.6125*** 1.4330** 1.7022*** 1.3865*** 1.2840* 1.4377**
(0.4984) (0.5849) (0.5991) (0.5207) (0.6683) (0.6640)
Household Well‐Being Index_Maize ‐1.1656** ‐1.3860** ‐1.0555** ‐1.2593** ‐1.5366** ‐1.1206**
(0.4720) (0.5690) (0.5217) (0.5104) (0.6684) (0.5570)
Log(Income in the past 3 months) 0.9251** 0.9995** 0.8900** 0.6506** 0.8198* 0.5667*
(0.3632) (0.3948) (0.4201) (0.3187) (0.4329) (0.3129)
Log(Income in the past 3 months)_Maize ‐0.6086** ‐0.8299** ‐0.4956 ‐0.8844*** ‐1.0189*** ‐0.8154***
(0.2761) (0.3293) (0.3032) (0.2785) (0.3795) (0.2572)
Log(Annual non‐food expenditure, 1,000 Rp) 0.7900*** 0.9435** 0.7150*** 0.6170** 0.8278* 0.5129***
(0.2548) (0.3846) (0.2362) (0.2434) (0.4497) (0.1939)
Log(Annual non‐food expenditure, 1,000 Rp)_Maize ‐0.5695** ‐0.8126** ‐0.4497** ‐0.4957** ‐0.8553** ‐0.3171**
(0.2387) (0.3504) (0.2128) (0.2114) (0.3915) (0.1506)
1 (any type of employment) 0.0662 ‐0.0156 0.1498 0.0691 ‐0.0323 0.1738
(0.0843) (0.0319) (0.1517) (0.1120) (0.0382) (0.2062)
1 (any type of employment)_Maize ‐0.0495 ‐0.0065 ‐0.093 ‐0.0489 0.007 ‐0.1058
(0.0758) (0.0369) (0.1250) (0.0971) (0.0465) (0.1596)
Panel E: Food Consumption and Expenditures
Food Index 0.0182 ‐0.2685 0.1615 ‐0.2822 ‐0.7353 ‐0.0556
(0.3900) (0.4931) (0.4588) (0.4913) (0.4897) (0.5932)
Food Index_Maize ‐0.0082 0.3389 ‐0.1818 0.0236 0.281 ‐0.1052
(0.2740) (0.4293) (0.3004) (0.2883) (0.4579) (0.3005)
log(Food consumption last week, in mok) 0.1782 ‐0.1148 0.3294 0.0179 ‐0.1236 0.0889
(0.1832) (0.1581) (0.2328) (0.1482) (0.1757) (0.1507)
log(Food consumption last week, in mok)_Maize 0.0575 0.0275 0.0651 ‐0.1096 ‐0.003 ‐0.1643*
(0.1427) (0.1096) (0.1830) (0.0889) (0.1125) (0.0986)
log(Food expenditure last week) ‐0.7681** ‐0.4226 ‐0.9276** ‐0.7449** ‐0.6168 ‐0.8180**
(0.3863) (0.5359) (0.4533) (0.3415) (0.3848) (0.4050)
log(Food expenditure last week)_Maize 0.365 0.6928 0.2429 0.6733*** 0.6012** 0.7221**
(0.2929) (0.4390) (0.3567) (0.2428) (0.2997) (0.2846)
1(Food expenditure was 0) 0.5993*** 0.6712*** 0.5633*** 0.6812*** 0.6258*** 0.7088***
(0.1393) (0.1515) (0.1613) (0.1584) (0.1832) (0.1767)
1(Food expenditure was 0)_Maize ‐0.6421*** ‐0.6559*** ‐0.6352*** ‐0.6779*** ‐0.6530*** ‐0.6904***
(0.1204) (0.1350) (0.1374) (0.1325) (0.1626) (0.1447)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption ‐3.1811*** ‐3.2542*** ‐3.1473*** ‐4.2741*** ‐3.9302*** ‐4.4433***
(1.0101) (1.1227) (1.1211) (1.0184) (1.2083) (1.1677)
Ratio of food expenditure to consumption_Maize 3.5995*** 3.5466*** 3.6262*** 4.3360*** 3.9714*** 4.5150***
(0.8620) (0.9836) (0.9375) (0.8937) (1.1193) (0.9337)
Share of consumption that is maize last week ‐0.1449*** ‐0.1659*** ‐0.1345*** ‐0.1498*** ‐0.1888*** ‐0.1303***
(0.0436) (0.0536) (0.0449) (0.0485) (0.0643) (0.0460)
Share of consumption that is maize last week_Maize 0.1387*** 0.1647*** 0.1254*** 0.1244*** 0.1424*** 0.1149***
(0.0362) (0.0447) (0.0371) (0.0358) (0.0479) (0.0350)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week 0.2172** 0.2087 0.2205** 0.2664*** 0.2541** 0.2717**
(0.0938) (0.1361) (0.0964) (0.0982) (0.1099) (0.1137)
Share of food expenditure that is maize last week_Maize ‐0.2532*** ‐0.2576** ‐0.2499*** ‐0.2431*** ‐0.2258** ‐0.2473**
(0.0856) (0.1160) (0.0894) (0.0942) (0.1003) (0.1087)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Heterogeneous treatment effect regressions by the main crop of the household (maize or rice farmers). Only post treatment data are included (round 3 to 6). Each regression 
corresponds to an instrumental variable regression where the dependent variable is an outcome variable and the 2 main independent variables are (i) a take‐up dummy 
instrumented with the treatment assignment (ii) the take‐up dummy interacted with a dummy for maize farmers. Maize farmers are defined as farmers who produced more 
maize than rice (calculated using yields averaged from the first and second rounds of the survey). The dependent variable for each regression is noted in the table. All regressions 
include district (kabupaten) fixed effects because assignment of treatment was within each district. Standard errors reported in the parentheses. All standard errors are clustered 
at the village level. Column 1 uses all the post treatment data (rounds 4 to 6). Column 2 only includes lean season data (round 5). Column 3 only includes harvest season data 
(round 4 and 6).
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Table S5: Summary of results for Storage treatment from instrumental variables regression 
All districts Alfa Omega districts
All:
Gap in food expenditure lower by 20,000 Rupiah **
High Storage:
Gap in food expenditure lower by 20,000 Rupiah *
All: All:
Food shortage index lower by 1.33 (L) * 14% less likely to report lack of food in the past month (A) * (only sig. for A)
18% less likely to report lack of food in the past month (L) *
High Storage: High Storage:
Food shortage index lower by 2.11 (L) *** Food shortage index lower by 2.75 (L) ***
32% less likely to anticipate food shortage in January (L) *** 47% less likely to anticipate food shortage in January (L) ***
9% less likely to anticipate food shortage in April (L) ** 11% less likely to anticipate food shortage in April (L) **
21% less likely to anticipate food shortage in November (L) ** 24% less likely to anticipate food shortage in November (L) ***
25% less likely to report lack of food in the past month (L) ** 31% less likely to report lack of food in the past month (L) **
High Storage: All:
8% less likely to anticipate health expenditure shortages (L) * 7% more likely to anticipate health expenditure shortages (H) *
High Storage:
8% less likely to anticipate health expenditure shortages (L) *
Report 1.3 fewer sick days (L) **
Household well‐being All: All:
Houhold well‐being index improve by 0.97 (H)* Annual non‐food expenditure higher by 33% (H) **
Annual non‐food expenditure higher by 40% (A) * High Storage:
High Storage: Annual non‐food expenditure higher by 47% (A) *
Household well‐being index higher by 1.10 (H) *
Annual non‐food expenditure higher by 53% (A) **
All: All:
19% more likely to report no food expenditure in the past week (L) * 31% more likely to report no food expenditure in the past week (H) **
High Storage: Spend 1800 Rp less per kg of staple consumed  (H) **
Spend 1400 Rp less per kg of staple consumed  (L) * 11% less maize as a share of staple consumption  (L) **
9% more maize as a share of staple expenditure  (A) **
High Storage:
33% more likely to report no food expenditure in the past week (H) *
Spend 1400 Rp less per kg of staple consumed  (L) *
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
This table summarizes the main results for the storage treatment (Tables S3 and S4). The estimates above are the coefficients on the TAKE UP dummy from an instrumental variables regression. (H) represent results using harvest season 
Anticipated and reported measures of food shortages
Seasonal differences NA
Health
Food consumption and expenditures
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